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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
SOME ASPECTS OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
IN MARYLANDt
By M. PEr MosER*
I. INTRODUCTiON
A. Scope Note
The Maryland law of powers of appointment has de-
veloped generally in the same pattern as has the law in
other states. But in this state the formal theories which
grew up in the early development of powers of appoint-
ment have not been treated in the same manner as in most
other jurisdictions. The purpose of this study is to search
for reasons underlying some of the Maryland rules, to
analyze these reasons, and through analysis attempt a
prophecy of future development in these areas of power
of appointment law. The tax aspects of powers of appoint-
ment in estate planning will then be considered, with em-
phasis placed upon the effect of the unique Maryland rules.
B. Development of Powers of Appointment
Powers of appointment were originally used to circum-
vent the restriction which existed prior to the passage of
the Statute of Wills' in 1540 against devising real property.
One might avoid these restrictions by transferring the
property inter vivos to another to the use of such persons as
he should appoint by will, and until or in default of appoint-
ment to the use of the transferor and his heirs.'
The continued popularity of powers of appointment
after the passage of the Statute of Wills was caused pri-
marily by the results of the "relation-back" doctrine.
t This was originally prepared, as a term paper for Professor A. JamesCasner's Property III course at Harvard Law School. The author, while
taking full responsibility for views set forth herein, wishes to express his
sincere appreciation to Professor Casner for his advice and help in the
preparation of the original paper.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1947, The Citadel; LL.B., 1950, Har-
vard Law School.
'32 Hen. VIII c. 1 (1540).
2 For more complete treatment of the development of powers see 1 SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS 430-438 (1936) ; KALEs, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS
706-748 (2d ed. 1920) ; FARWELL, POWERS (3rd ed. 1916); SUODEN, POWERS(8th ed. 1861) ; CHANCE, PowERs (1831).
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Simply stated, this is the doctrine saying that the donee
acts as the agent of the donor in exercising a power of
appointment. The gift by the donee takes effect as if it
were incorporated in the instrument creating the power.'
It follows that creditors of a donee could not reach appoin-
tive assets and that the spouse of a donee had no marital
interest in them.
Gradually, courts came to realize that although the
donee had no formal property interest in appointive assets,
in substance he could derive the same benefit from the
exercise of certain types of powers as he could if he owned
the property outright. Exceptions then were made to the
formal iron-bound rule of relation-back.
C. Modern Significance
In recent years the power of appointment has become
increasingly important as a convenient type of testamen-
tary disposition. A testator, by giving a life estate with a
power of appointment over the remainder, projects the final
distribution of the assets to the time his donee exercises
the power. In this way he 'can create a future interest, yet
preserve flexibility so that, for example, the donee can give
a larger proportionate share of the appointive assets to the
neediest members of a class.
An additional incentive to use powers of appointment
in testamentary dispositions is that tax savings may thereby
result. Thus if a donor creates by will a life estate with a
power of appointment over the remainder, although the
appointive assets will be taxed in his estate, they will escape
a second tax in the donee's estate, provided that the power
is one excepted by the Internal Revenue Code from taxa-
tion in the donee's estate.4 A testator may secure the mari-
8 See Pope v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 247, 161 Atl. 404,
407 (1932) ; MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS IN MARYLAND 728 (1927) (here-
inafter referred to as MILLER, WILs).
'INT. REv. CoDE, sec. 811(f) (2); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24. Prior
to the 1942 amendments to the Code, a donor could create a power of appoint-
ment exercisable by the donee in favor of himself, his estate, or his creditors,
and the appointive assets would not be taxed in the donee's estate unless he
exercised the power and the assets passed under the power. Revenue Act of
1926, sec. 302(f). See infra, Section VD 1, p. 56.
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tal deduction given by the Revenue Act of 19481 by giving
his surviving spouse an equitable life estate in certain types
of assets with a broad power of appointment over these
assets.6
II. NATURE OF PowERs OF APPOINTmENT
A. Definition
The conception of what types of powers are powers of
appointment has been enlarged in recent years by develop-
ments in the taxation of powers. Before these developments
there was a tendency towards narrowing the definition of
"power of appointment", excluding such powers as a power
of sale, a power of revocation, and a power to invade the
corpus of a trust.7 But the Revenue Acts and the Treasury
Regulations have included in the definition types of powers
which are in substance powers of appointment, whether or
not called such in conveyances or by state law.'
It appears better to adopt the substantial meaning of
"power of appointment" rather than to restrict the defini-
tion to a narrow property-law concept, because of the in-
creasing importance of the taxation of powers A power
of appointment, then, is any right, given by someone (the
donor) to another (the donee) or reserved by the donor to
himself, to dispose of property (which the donor owns or
has control over) in such manner and to such persons as
the donor may prescribe, except for powers which are
'Section 361(a) and (b).
The power of appointment must be one under which the surviving spouse
may appoint to her estate or herself. INT. REv. CODE, see. 812(e) (1) (F) ;
U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a(c). The interest in the assets given a sur-
viving spouse must not be a "terminable interest". INT. REV. CODE, sec.
812(e) (1) (B); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47b(e). See inlra, Section
VB, p. 41.
'For example, the definition of "power of appointment" in the RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY sec. 318(2) (1940), specifically excludes a power of revo-
cation, a power to cause a gift of income to be augmented from principal, a
power to designate charities, a power of sale, a power of attorney, a chari-
table trust, or an honorary trust.
8 See INT. REV. CODE, sees. 811(f), 1000(c) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec.
81.24(b) (1) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 86.2(b). Reserved powers of appoint-
ment might be taxed in the settlor's estate by sec. 811(f), but the broader
language of sec. 811(c) and (d) is normally applied to tax any reservation
of control by a settlor, including the reservation of a power to appoint.
Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.19.
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ministerial or managerial in nature, powers of attorney,
charitable or honorary trusts, and powers of sale.'
This definition will include a power to invade the corpus
of a trust, whether given to the life beneficiary or to a
trustee who has no beneficial interest in the appointive
assets.'0 A power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate a
trust reserved by the settlor or given to the trustee is in-
cluded. 1 A power to designate charities also is a power of
appointment within the definition adopted for purposes of
this study. Power to determine whether funds are corpus
or income is on the borderline between a power of appoint-
ment and a managerial power. Logically it is a power of
appointment, because the donee, by designating whether
the assets are income or corpus, in effect appoints to the life
beneficiary or to the remainderman. But for tax purposes
this type of power has thus far been held to be merely
managerial.
B. Classification
The classification of powers of appointment has created
much confusion, but the following simplification should lend
itself adequately to a consideration of the modern cases.
Cf. Maryland Mutual Benevolent Society v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 433,
22 Am. Rep. 52, 55 (1876), where it is stated:
" 'A power is defined to be a "liberty" or "authority" reserved by,
or limited to, a party to dispose of real or personal property for his
own benefit, or for the benefit of others, and operating upon an estate
or interest, vested either in himself or in some other person; the liberty
or authority, however, not being derived out of such estate or interest,
but overreaching or superseding it, either wholly or partially.' Butler,
note 1, to Co. Lit. 342b; 1 Chance on Powers, see. 1."
Quoted with approval in Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239,
245, 161 Atl. 404, 406 (1932) and in MILLER, WILLs 701 (1927).
10 Logically, whether a power to invade corpus is given to the life bene-
ficiary or to a trustee without beneficial interest should make no difference.
But such a power given to a person without beneficial interest in the appoin-
tive assets is not within the definition of "power of appointment" in the
Internal Revenue Code, sees. 811(f) (2) (B), 1000(c). The Code defines
"power of appointment" to include only those powers which are taxed in
the donee's estate. See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gir TAXATIoN 254, n. 1
(Supp. 1946).
11 The reservation of a power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate by the
settlor would cause assets subject to the power to be taxed in his estate by
sec. 811(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. A similar power given a trustee
without beneficial Interest would be excepted from taxation in the trustee's
estate by sec. 811(f) (2) (B). If the trustee had a beneficial interest in the
appointive assets, they would be taxed in his estate unless the power was
excepted by sec. 811(f) (2) (A).
' E.g., Estate of Fiske, 5 T. C. M. 42, Dec. 14964(M) (1946) ; Contra (in
effect); Estate of Hager, 5 T. C. M. 972, Dec. 15480(M) (1946).
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All powers of appointment have four common features
by which they may be classified. First, a power is in gross
if the donee has an estate in the appointive assets which is
not affected by the exercise of the power; appendant, if
the donee has an estate in the appointive assets which is
divested 1y the exercise of the power; 3 or collateral if the
donee has no estate at all in the appointive assets.
14
Second, a power is reserved when the donor retains the
exercise of the power in himself; or not reserved when the
donor creates the power exercisable by another.
Third, a power is testamentary if the donee may appoint
only by will; presently exercisable if the donee may exer-
cise the power at any time during his life or by will; or
contingent if the donee may exercise the power only after
a condition precedent has been satisfied.
Fourth, a power is general when the donee may appoint
to anyone including himself, his estate, or his creditors;
special when the donee may appoint among a limited class
not unreasonably large; or hybrid if the group of appointees
is limited somewhere between these two classes.
Special powers are exclusive if the donor's intent is con-
strued to permit the donee to appoint to certain members
of the limited class, yet exclude others; or non-exclusive,
if the donor's intent is construed to require the donee to
give a portion of the appointive assets to each member of
the class.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, sec. 325 (1940), suggests that a modern court
should treat a power appendant as if it were no power at all, since the
donor of such a power gives the donee a fee simple, then adds a power to
appoint to anyone but the donee. The right to dispose of property is one the
donee already has by reason of his ownership. Contra: Legget v. Doremus,
25 N. J. Eq. 122 (1874), (which held that creditors who had attached a
debtor's assets subject to an appendant power of sale could not enjoin the
exercise of the power). No Maryland case has upheld the exercise of a
power appendant, but powers appendant were present in the following
cases: Cook v. Councilman, 109 Md. 622, 72 Atl. 404 (1909) ; Worthington v.
Rich, 77 Md. 265, 26 Atl. 403 (1893) ; Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67 (1881)
Nevin v. Gillespie, 56 Md. 320 (1881).
J" Cf. Reid v. Gordon, 35 Md. 174, 184 (1872), (a case Involving a power
of sale) :
"Powers, It Is said, are either appendant, or in gross, or altogether
collateral; appendant, when the exercise of them is in the first instance
to interfere with, and to a certain extent, to supersede the estate of the
donee of such power; in gross, when they do not commence until the
determination of the estate of the donee; and collateral, when the donee
has no estate at all in the property which is the subject of the power."
19511
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A type of hybrid power which merits special definition
is a power given the donee by another, unlimited as to whom
he may appoint. Maryland courts imply a limitation that
the donee may not appoint assets subject to such a power
to himself, his estate, or his creditors. 5 For purposes of
this study the power unlimited as to appointees, created for
the donee by another, will be called a Maryland general
power.
C. General Characteristics
Before considering characteristics of special and general
powers, some rules which apply to all powers or which
depend on whether a power is presently exercisable or is
testamentary must be discussed.
1. Scope of the donee's discretion
A basic characteristic which is a corollary of the "rela-
tion-back" doctrine16 and applies in every area of the law
of powers is that the donee must exercise a power within
the limits set by the donor." Thus the donor can require
that two or more named individuals must act together in
exercising a power and an appointment by only one is
invalid.' The donor may create a power operating only
after the occurrence of a condition precedent. 9
The donor who creates a testamentary power of any kind
desires the donee to remain free to exercise his discretion
until he dies. Therefore an inter vivos contract to appoint
15 Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390. 16 AtI. 16 (1888).
"This is the doctrine that the donee's appointment is read as if it were
incorporated in the instrument creating the power. See supra, Section IB,
p. 13.
'
1 This characteristic Is the primary difference between a power over, and
ownership of, property. Ordinarily, the owner of property is not restricted
as to the manner in which he may dispose of it. However, the donee of a
power cannot exceed the limits set by the donor. This rule applies to
general powers, as well as to the more limited types, although most of the
cases concern special powers. See. e.g., Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107,
63 AtI. 209 (1906), (involving a fraudulent appointment under a special
power) : Myers v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 73 Md. 413, 21 Atl. 58 (1891),
(as to the type of estate a donee may appoint) ; Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md.
390, 16 Atl. 16 (1888), (on the limits of appointment of property subject to
a Maryland general power).
IsPowles v. Jordan, 62 Md. 499 (1884), (concerning a power of sale).
Cf. Schley v. McCeney, 36 Md. 266 (1872), (as to the application of this rule
to powers of appointment).
19 See Thorn v. Thorn, 101 Md. 444, 61 Atl. 193 (1905).
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assets subject to such a power to someone by will is un-
enforceable." However, the release of a power would prob-
ably be permitted in Maryland.21
2. Rule against Perpetuities
The effect of the Rule against Perpetuities2 2 on powers
of appointment is important today as preventive medicine:
if one knows what the courts have held, he should not create
a disposition which may violate the Rule.23 Discussion in
this study will be limited to the manner in which the period
for the Rule is computed and the basic mechanics of its
application to powers of appointment.24
In Maryland, the period for the Rule is computed from
the donor's death, if the power is created by will, or from
the time the donor executes the deed, if the power is created
inter vivos. 2 However, because of the similarity to actual
ownership, courts in other states have held that where the
donor creates a general power which the donee can exer-
cise at any time in favor of himself or his creditors, the
period for the Rule is computed from the time the donee
exercises the power. 6 If a power the donee may exercise
at any time in favor of himself or his creditors (as dis-
Robinson v. Robinson, 4 Md. Ch. 176 (1852), partially reversed on an-
other point in Wilson v. Farquharson, 5 Md. 134 (1853). There is no Mary-
land case involving an inter vivos contract to appoint under a power which
is presently exercisable; but it is likely that such a contract would be
treated as a valid exercise of the power, if the donee complies with the other
formalities prescribed by the donor.
U MD. CODE SUPp. (1947), Art. 93, See. 345A, provides:
"Unless the instrument creating the (power of appointment) specifi-
cally provides to the contrary, a power of appointment of any kind or
character . . . whether exercisable . . . by deed or will or otherwise
may ... be released in whole or in part..."
But cf. O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d 813, 163 A. L. R. 1444(1945). For a detailed discussion of the release as related to the taxation
of powers see infra, Section VD 2, p .......
" The Rule as stated by Professor Gray is that "No interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest." 'GRAY, PERPTUITIES, see. 201 (4th
ed. 1942).
n It is possible to use the lives of several healthy babies as "lives in being".
Since one or more of the babies will probably live to be seventy or eighty
years of age, a draftsman can create a disposition which may last for nearly
a century.
2 For a complete analysis of the Rule against Perpetuities see GRAY,
PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942). The Rule in Maryland is considered In MnLLER,
WILLs 887-945 (1927). For an excellent condensed analysis see Leach, Per-
petuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638 (1938).
2r Lamkin v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 64 A. 2d 704 (Md. 1949).
10 Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525 (1888).
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tinguished from the more limited Maryland general power)
were before a Maryland court, it is likely that the period
for the Rule would be computed from the time the donee
exercises the power, as it is in other states.
The mechanics of the Rule as applied to powers of
appointment are complex, but operate with the precision of
mathematics. A consideration of the basic rules may be
divided into validity of the power and validity of the
appointment.
If a power might be exercised at a time beyond the
period of perpetuities, it is void.17 Thus where the donor
creates by will a testamentary power of appointment in his
first-born grandchild and he has no grandchildren at his
death, the power is void because it might be exercised more
than twenty-one years after the death of the donor's child,
who is the life in being at the donor's death.
If the donee's disposition may not vest within a life in
being and twenty-one years from the creation of the power
then the appointment is void. 8 For example, where the
donee of a testamentary power appoints "to my nephew,
C., if he becomes a lawyer", and the nephew was not alive
at the donor's death, the appointment is void, because it may
not vest within twenty-one years from the death of the
donee, who is the life in being.
3. Special powers
A special power of appointment, particularly a non-
exclusive special testamentary power, is in many ways like
a trust.
An appointment to someone not a member of the named
class is a fraud on the power.2 9 If a special power of appoint-
ment is not exercised, or for some reason an attempt to
exercise it fails, and there is no gift in default of appoint-
ment, a court of equity will dispose of the appointive assets
GRAY, PE.PiruriT s, sec. 477 (4th ed. 1942). Cf. Bundy v. United States
Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926).
0 Boyd's Estate. 199 Pa. 487, 49 Atl. 297 (1901).
2 Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 Atl. 209 (1906) ; Thorn v. Thorn,
101 Md. 444, 63 Atl. 193 (1905) ; Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788
(1898). But cf. Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl.
497 (1926) (where the donee's appointment to an illegitimate child under
a power to appoint to children was upheld). MnLLrn, WILS 747, 748 (1927).
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as it feels the donor would have wanted them to pass in
the absence of an appointment by the donee3 0 Normally
this results in all members of the class sharing equally in
the appointive property. 1
4. General powers
The rights of the donee of a general power are similar
to those of the owner of property.
In most states the donee of such a power may use the
appointive assets as he wishes, so long as he complies with
the formalities required by the donor.32 Anti-lapse statutes
generally are applied to prevent failure of appointments
attempted by the donee of a general power.3
In Maryland the donor cannot create a true general
power in another person merely by using in his conveyance
unrestricted terms as to possible appointees.34 However, if
a power is made expressly exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate or his creditors, it is probable that the power will
be treated by Maryland courts as are true general powers
in other states.
A settlor who reserves a testamentary power with no
restrictions as to the persons to whom he may appoint, or
as to the amount each person shall receive, may appoint by
will to his creditors.3 5  The court reasons that such an
81 There are no cases in Maryland on this point. Some courts in otherjurisdictions speak of the special power as a "power in trust", which the
donee must exercise. See MILLER, WILLS 733 (1927). Under this theory if
the donee fails to exercise the power, the court itself will assume jurisdic-
tion and "exercise" it. Other courts state that in the absence of an express
default clause they will imply a gift in default of appointment. E.g., Bridge-
water v. Turner, 161 Tenn. 111, 29 S. W. 2d 659 (1930) ; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY, sec. 367 (1940). Compare the Maryland cases involving general
powers where it is said appointive property passes as property of the donor
on intestacy, if there is no appointment and no gift in default; Worthington
v. Rich, 77 Md. 265, 26 Atl. 403 (1893) ; Mines v. Gambrill, 71 Md. 30, 18
Atl. 43 (1889) ; Foos v. Scarf, 55 Md. 301 (1881). Cf. Smith v. Hardesty,
88 Md. 387, 41 AtI. 788 (1898).
11 The result might be different If the appointment was to be to one member
of a class.
2 A general power is by definition one exercisable in favor of the donee,
if it is presently exercisable, his estate, or his creditors. Supra, Section II
B, p. 16. See MIFLER, WILLS 731-733 (1927).
1 There are no cases under the Maryland statute. See Thompson v. Pew,
214 Mass. 520, 102 N. E. 122 (1913) ; Note, 14 N. C. L. Rev. 302 (1936).
a, See Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16 (1888).
Wyeth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md. 369, 4 A. 2d 753, noted
4 Md. L. Rev. 297 (1939). See Raffel v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 100 Md.
141, 59 AtI. 702 (1905).
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appointment cannot frustrate the donor's intent as to limits
on the donee's discretion, since the donor and the donee
are the same person. It follows from this reasoning that the
settlor-donee of a reserved power such as this could also
appoint by will to his estate. Thus a donor in Maryland can
reserve a true general power without stating specifically
that the power shall be exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate or his creditors.
5. Maryland General Power
The courts in Maryland differ basically from those in
a majority of jurisdictions in their treatment of a power of
appointment created by the donor for another without limit
as to possible appointees. It is stated that:
"A power of appointment is said to be general when
there is no limitation as to its exercise (except as to
the manner), nor as to the persons in whose favor it is
to be exercised, nor as to the amounts to be given to
such persons. 3 6
But Maryland courts imply a limitation on such a power
that the donee may not appoint to himself, his estate, or his
creditors, even though they call it a "general" power.
III. RIGHTS OF A DoNEE's CREDITORS IN
APPOINTIVE PROPERTY
To evaluate the cases concerning the rights of creditors
of a donee in property over which he has a power of appoint-
ment, one should understand that the decisions represent
attempts by the courts to resolve an underlying conflict of
policies. On one side is the policy operating in favor of
creditors, that a donee who has virtually complete enjoy-
ment of wealth should be required to pay his debts with
this wealth, if his owned assets are insufficient for the pur-
pose. On the other side is the policy in favor of allowing a
donor to impose conditions on the transfer of property. The
latter policy is defeated if a donee's creditors are permitted
mSee Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 64 A- 2d 704, 707 (Md. 1949).
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to reach appointive assets, unless by the terms of the power
the donee could appoint to his creditors.
If the donee has a special power of appointment, the
balance is in favor of the policy for allowing a donor to
impose conditions on the transfer of property. But if the
donee has a general power which he could exercise in favor
of his creditors, the balance should be in favor of such
creditors,87 since the restrictions the donor has imposed on
the exercise of the power will not be violated.
In the treatment of special and general powers of
appointment where the donee is also the donor or settlor,
analysis is directed towards the rights of creditors based
on an assumption that the original conveyance by the set-
tlor-donee was not a fraud on his creditors."8
A. Special Powers of Appointment
Creditors of the donee of any type of special power of
appointment would probably not be permitted by the Mary-
land courts to reach the appointive assets. Discussion of
this subject may be divided into consideration of powers
created by someone not the donee and powers reserved by
the donee.
1. Powers created by someone not the donee
The right of creditors to reach appointive property
where the donee was given a life estate with a power to
appoint by will among a limited class has been at issue, and
only indirectly, in one Maryland case. It was held that the
donee of a testamentary power to appoint to his children
37Courts in a majority of the jurisdictions require that the donee exercise
some dominion over the appointive property before they will allow creditors
to reach it, even where the donee could have exercised the power in favor
of his creditors. See. e.g., Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879). This
requirement is based on the theory that unless the donee exercises or
attempts to exercise the power, the property passes by the will of the donor,
or by other instrument of creation.
Statutes 13 ELIz. c. 5 (1570) and 27 ELIz. c. 4 (1585), are part of the
Maryland law of fraudulent conveyances. MD. CODE, Art. 39B (1939), con-
tains the Maryland version of the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcEs Ac'r.
See Brinton v. Hook, 3 Md. Ch. 477 (1850), (in which the reservation of a
general power exercisable by deed or will by the donee was held to be in
fraud of creditors, although the donee did not exercise the power). See Note
33 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 1293 (1935).
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could not exercise the power in favor of his creditors."
A fortiori, where a donee made no attempt to appoint to his
creditors they could not reach assets subject to a power to
appoint to a limited class.
2. Powers reserved by the donee
Although there are no cases involving attempts by credi-
tors to reach appointive property where the donee has
reserved a power to appoint to a limited class, in the absence
of a fraud on creditors in the original transaction, the fact
that the settlor-donee could appoint only to a small group
of persons would be determinative in precluding creditors
from reaching the appointive assets.
B. General Powers of Appointment
Three types of powers of appointment will be discussed
in this Sub-section: the Maryland general power, the re-
served general power, and the power created for the donee
by another expressly exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate, or his creditors. The Maryland general power,
although actually a form of hybrid power, is considered
here because Maryland courts call it a general power. The
reserved general power is considered here because Mary-
land courts will probably treat it, in determining the rights
of creditors to appointive assets, as courts in other jurisdic-
tions treat general powers. With the background provided
by analysis of the Maryland general power and the reserved
general power, the rights of creditors in appointive assets
subject to a power created for the donee by another ex-
pressly exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate, or his
creditors will be considered.
1. The Maryland general power
The leading case on the ability of creditors to reach
property subject to a Maryland general power is Balls v.
Dampman.4 0 The donee's husband gave her a life estate in
Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 Atl. 209 (1906).
69 Md. 390, 16 Ati. 16 (1888). See a related case, Balls v. Balls, 69 Md.
388, 16 Atl. 18 (1888).
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realty with power "to will and dispose of the same in such
manner as she may see fit by any instrument in the nature
of a will she may see proper to make", and in default of
appointment to her two youngest daughters. The donee left
a will which in the first paragraph ordered all her just debts
paid, then devised and bequeathed all her real, mixed, and
personal property to her two youngest daughters. The
donee's owned assets were insufficient to pay her creditors.
The court called the question one of construction as to
whether the donee exercised the power, and under the rule
then existing4' it was held that the residuary clause exer-
cised the power, but that the direction to pay debts had no
effect at all. As a second reason for finding against the
creditor the court cited the fact that the donee had only
power to name persons to whom the property should go, and
"... had no authority to devise it for the payment of
her debts, that is, to encumber or consume it altogether,
for her own use. The construction insisted on would,
if adopted, practically convert her from a mere life
tenant into an owner of the fee."4
In construing the donor's intent to limit the scope of
appointment, the court in the Balls case failed to follow the
existing law and, it seems, did not recognize the basic
issues. No authorities were cited for the proposition that
creditors cannot reach property subject to an unlimited
power of appointment where the donee exercises the power.
Evidently, no cases involving similar powers were men-
tioned to the court. In fact, it appears that the creditor
conceded that he had no right to reach the appointive prop-
erty but for the direction to pay debts contained in the
donee's will.
" The rule applied by the court was that a power Is exercised where a
provision of the donee's will would be inoperative unless appointive property
were included in his dispositions. In the Balls case the donee had no real
property except that subject to the power of appointment her husband gave
her. Since the residuary clause would otherwise have been inoperative as to
realty, the court found that the power was exercised.
, 69 Md. 390, 394, 16 Atl. 16, 18 (1888). This dictum has been cited with
approval in many of the Maryland power of appointment cases. See, e.g.,
Wyeth v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 176 Md. 369, 375, 4 A. 2d 753, 756,




The similarity of an unlimited power to complete owner-
ship was overlooked in the opinion and was not stressed
in argument. The creditor did not venture to explain that
the gift in default was merely a provision against a failure
to appoint to anyone, and was not intended to limit the
scope of the donee's possible appointments. Had counsel
raised these points and cited available cases, the creditor
should have won."
There is one ground on which the decision can be sus-
tained: the appointment was to the takers in default of
the same shares that they would have taken had the donee
made no appointment. It could be argued that there was in
reality no appointment, and the creditor should not have
been allowed to reach property subject to the power, since
it was not exercised.4 However, the court treated the power
as having been effectively exercised and did not mention
this line of reasoning.
However, if one accepts as correct the construction of
the donor's intent to limit the scope of appointment in the
Balls case, the conclusion that creditors could not reach the
appointive assets was parallel to existing authority. Under
the majority rule the basis for allowing creditors to reach
property subject to a general power was first, that by a
construction of the donor's intent the donee could appoint
to his creditors if he wished, and second, that the donee
had exercised some dominion over the power by at least
an attempt to appoint.45 Since the first point is absent if
one accepts the Maryland rule of construction of the donor's
intent to limit the scope of appointment, it would be a fraud
"Creditors of the donee had been permitted to reach property subject to
a general testamentary power of appointment if the donee actually exercised
the power. 'SUGDEN, POWERS, (8th ed. 1861), p. 471, and the cases cited in
n. (s) ; Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879). In some jurisdictions this
view had not been followed. Wales v. Bowdish, 61 Vt. 23, 17 Atl. 1000
(1889) ; Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. St. 277 (1849).
"This argument has not been discussed in any Maryland case. See Hollo-
way v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497 (1926) ; Emmanuel
Church v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 169 Md. 28, 179 Atl. 164 (1935). But
some cases in other jurisdictions follow this argument: Helvering v. Grin-
nell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935) ; Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber
Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S. W. 1162 (1909) ; Matter of Lansing, 182
N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905). See also RETATEMENT, PROPERTY, sec. 369
(1941).
"See, e.g., Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881). Notes, 38 Yale L. J. 395
(1929), 27 Mich. L. Rev. 231 (1928), 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 422 (1928).
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on the power to allow a donee to appoint to his creditors."
In light of such a construction, in the absence of a direct
appointment to creditors, the basis for not allowing their
claims in appointive assets is even stronger.
2. The reserved general power
If the donee has created a life estate for himself with a
general power reserved, creditors can reach the appointive
property if the power is presently exercisable, whether or
not the donee exercises the power. 7 This result is reached
because in such a case it is extremely difficult to prove
actual fraudulent intent at the time of the original transac-
tion and the donee has kept absolute control over the
property. 8
Creditors can reach the income from appointive prop-
erty where the donee has created a life estate in trust re-
serving a general power exercisable by will only.4 9 How-
ever, during the donee's life, creditors cannot reach the
principal of property subject to a general testamentary
power.5" Since the donee could not appoint to his creditors
during his lifetime, these rules seem logical.
A donee who has reserved a general testamentary power
can appoint by will to his creditors. In Wyeth v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. 1 the donee transferred property to a
trustee to pay her the income for life, remainder as she
should direct by last will and testament. The court found
, The similarity, under the construction in the Balls case, of a general
power in Maryland created by one other than the donee to a special power
Is apparent. Under this construction of the scope of appointment of the
donee of a general power, it is as much a fraud on the power for the donee
to exercise It In favor of his creditors as it would be for him to exercise a
special power in favor of one outside the class prescribed by the donor.
47 Scott v. Keane, 87 Md. 709, 40 Atl. 1070 (1898). Cf. Brinton v. Hook,
3 Md. Ch. 477 (1850).
Cf. Note, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 1293.
"Warner v. Rice, 66 Md. 436, 8 Atl. 84 (1887).
Wyeth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md. 369, 4 A. 2d 753, noted 4 Md.
L. Rev. 297 (1939) ; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 167
Md. 158, 173 Atl. 31, 93 A. L. R. 1205, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 19 Minn. L. Rev.
347 (1934) ; See Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 161 Atl. 404
(1932). Cf. Raffel v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 100 Md. 141, 59 Atl. 702(1905). The note in the Michigan Law Review indicates that the Bergdorf
case, holding that creditors cannot reach appointive property subject to a
reserved general power to appoint by will even where the donee has also
reserved a life estate, Is contrary to the majority rule in the United States.
176 Md. 369, 4 A. 2d 753, noted 4 Md. L. Rev. 297 (1939).
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that she exercised the power in her will and upheld appoint-
ments to a creditor.
The problem of violation of the donor's intent was not
present as it was in the Balls case, since the donee here
was also the donor. In considering prior cases, the court
stated that they must be limited to their facts, these being
either that the donee and donor were different persons or
that the powers were so worded as to exclude creditors.
The court distinguished between the situations where
creditors are appointed by the donee of a reserved gen-
eral testamentary power, and those where they are not so
appointed, on the basis of the "relation-back" doctrine.52
This dictum indicates that the donee of a reserved general
testamentary power does not take the appointive property
out of the deed creating the power even where he exercises
a dominion over the power by appointing to someone. Such
a finding would not be in agreement with the majority rule,
although it technically is in accord with the Maryland law
as enunciated in Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.53 But the
Pope case did not involve the rights of creditors in appoin-
tive assets, so if the direct question arose whether creditors
can reach appointive assets under a reserved general testa-
mentary power exercised by will, the Pope case might be
distinguished or even overruled. Since property subject to
a reserved general testamentary power is practically the
same as owned property, a decision that creditors can reach
property subject to the power if it is exercised would cer-
tainly be the most reasonable result.54
8 2The court cited Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 161 Atl.
404 (1932), after making this distinction. Since this case held that property
subject to a reserved general power of appointment exercised by will was
not a part of the donee's estate when he died because the exercise was as
though incorporated in the deed creating the power, the court in the Wyeth
case seems to cite the Pope case as a direct decision in support of its
proposition.
163 Md. 239, 161 Atl. 404 (1932).
rA See Note, 4 Md. L. Rev. 297, 302, where it is suggested that the Wyeth
case does not expressly approve the Pope case, but merely distinguishes it,
and that the court in the Pope case may have assumed that no general
testamentary power, no matter by whom it was created, could be exercised
in favor of the donee's creditors. These arguments would aid in the finding
suggested in the text above. But it appears that the court in the Wyeth
case did directly approve the application in the Pope case of the "relation-
back" doctrine. See n. 52, supra. Therefore the finding suggested in the text
above would necessitate at least a partial overruling of the Pope case.
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3. The general power not reserved
If a donor creates a general testamentary power ex-
pressly exercisable in favor of the donee's estate or his
creditors, the donee could appoint to his creditors. If the
donee of such a power, having insufficient owned assets to
meet his obligations, exercises the power, the Wyeth dic-
tum" would probably be overruled, the Pope case56 dis-
tinguished, and creditors permitted to reach the appointive
assets.5
A presently exercisable general power with express lan-
guage permitting the donee to appoint to himself, his estate,
or his creditors should receive the same treatment. If the
donee exercises the power either by deed or will, his credi-
tors should be allowed to reach the appointive assets.
C. The Federal Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Act casts aside most of the old common
law of powers and bases its results more on substance than
on form. The Act provides that the Trustee in Bankruptcy
shall be
U.... vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt, as of the date of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, . . . to all . . . (3) powers which he
might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those
which he might have exercised solely for some other
person."5
A question immediately arises as to what types of powers
are included in the definition of those that vest in the
Trustee. There are no cases under Maryland law and the
Bankruptcy Act involving attempts by the Trustee of a
donee to reach appointive assets. But the answer is plain
if the wording of the statute, the Maryland cases on powers
- 176 Md. 369, 376, 4 A. 2d 753, 756 (1939).
- 163 Md. 239, 161 Atl. 404 (1932).
' See Note, 4 Md. L. Rev. 297, 303, where the writer suggests that the Balls
case might be overruled.
1252 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U. S. C. sec. 110(a) (1946).
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of appointment, and the rulings of courts in other jurisdic-
tions are followed.59
1. Special powers of appointment
Clearly any type of special power cannot be reached by
the Trustee of a donee, since the power is one the bankrupt
could exercise only in favor of some other person who is a
member of the class limited by the donor.
2. General powers of appointment
Cases hold that the Trustee can reach a general power
if the bankrupt may exercise it in favor of himself as of the
date of filing the petition in bankruptcy, but cannot reach
a testamentary general power.60 Because the bankrupt may
not appoint to himself, assets subject to a Maryland general
power presently exercisable would not vest in the Trustee.
A fortiori, property subject to a testamentary Maryland
general power would not vest in the Trustee.
However, a Trustee in Maryland can probably reach a
power created by the donor and expressly exercisable by
deed or will in favor of the donee, his estate, or his creditors,
if the power is exercisable as of the date of filing the peti-
tion. The Trustee cannot reach such a power if it is testa-
mentary, since the donee cannot exercise it for his own
benefit.
A general power reserved by a donor presents a more
difficult problem. Scott v. Keane6 holds that a reserved
general power presently exercisable can be reached by
creditors even though the donee fails to exercise the power.
A fortiori, the donee of this type of power can appoint to
his creditors. If it also follows that the donee can appoint
to himself, then the Trustee can reach the appointive assets.
Because of the similarity of such a power to ownership, a
court in bankruptcy proceedings would probably hold that
assets subject to a reserved general power presently exer-
13 See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill, 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 369,
381-384 (1937), for a discussion of the 1938 amendments to sec. 70(a) of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act; RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY, sec. 331 (1940).
0E.g., Montague v. Silsbee, 218 Mass. 107, 105 N. E. 611 (1914).
87 Md. 709, 40 Atl. 1070 (1898).
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cisable vest in the Trustee, even in the absence of a Mary-
land case stating that the donee of such a power can appoint
to himself. A reserved testamentary general power could
not be reached by the Trustee, since the donee could not
exercise the power in favor of himself.61
3. Miscellaneous problems
Two other questions concerning powers of appointment
and the Bankruptcy Act are: (a) what constitutes a prefer-
ential appointment and (b) what value should be allotted a
power in determining whether a donee is insolvent within
the definition of the Act?63
It is likely that any deed exercising a power which ordi-
narily would vest in the Trustee under the Act, executed
within four months before the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy is a preference. 4
The second question is more difficult to answer. How-
ever, it is probable that the full value of the appointive
assets would be considered part of the donee's estate in
bankruptcy for purposes of determining whether he is in-
solvent within the definition of the Act, because the donee
can make the appointive property his own merely by exe-
cuting a deed.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE IN
APPOINTIvE ASsETS OF THE DONEE
The spouse of a donee may have an interest in appointive
assets whether or not the donee exercises the power in her
favor. The donee may appoint property subject to a power
to his spouse only if the exercise is within the limits set by
the donor when he created the power.6 5
1 Cf. Raffel v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 100 Md. 141, 59 Atl. 702 (1905).
But see Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26. 7 A. 2d 180 (1939).
6A preference is defined in 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. sec. 96(a)
(1946). The definition of "Insolvency" for purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
appears in 60 STAT. 323 (1946), 11 U. S. C. sec. 1 (19) (1946).
. For other problems created by the 1938 amendments in The Chandler
Act as to preferences see Hanna, Preferences in Bankruptcy, 8 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 311 (1948) ; McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60
Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1946).
The question is more one of the permissible scope of the donee's appoint-
ment than it is of the rights of his spouse in appointive assets, but is con-




More complicated problems arise where the donee does
not exercise the power in favor of his surviving spouse.
The rights of the survivor are then determined by the stat-
utes and constructional case law which prevent a decedent
from depriving his spouse of a minimum portion of his
property by will."
A. Where the Donee Appoints to his Spouse
The type of power the donor gives the donee determines
whether or not he may appoint to his surviving spouse.
It is clear that the donee of a special power cannot
appoint to his surviving spouse unless the spouse is a mem-
ber of the class the donor has designated.6 7 An appointment
to a spouse who is included in the class must comply with
the donor's intent as expressed in the instrument creating
the power.68
Can the donee of a Maryland general power appoint to
his surviving spouse? There are arguments on both sides
of the question. Against permitting such an appointment,
one can cite the language of the court in cases involving
appointments to creditors of assets subject to a Maryland
general power, to the effect that the donee of such a power
cannot consume the appointive assets wholly for his own
benefit.69 The marital obligation to provide for one's hus-
band or wife" by will is as important as the obligation to
pay debts. It follows that the donee consumes appointive
assets for his own benefit when he appoints to his surviving
spouse, just as he does when he appoints to his creditors.
The same rules should apply in both situations, so the donee
The general provisions appear in MD. CODE, Art. 93, secs. 313-330; Art.
45, sec. 7 (1939) ; MD. CODE Supp., Art. 93, secs. 314, 315; Art. 45, sec. 6
(1947).
M07ILER, Wi.Ls secs. 261, 263 (1927) ; Cf. Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md.
107, 63 A.tl. 209 (1906) ; Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 387, 41 Atl. 788 (1898);
Myers v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 73 Md. 413, 21 Atl. 58 (1891).
1 For example, if the wife is a member of the class, and the donor indi-
cates that the appointment must be to all members of the class of a sub-
stantial part of the appointive assets, then an appointment to the wife alone
would be void. Barrett's Executor v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 411, 179 S. W. 396
(1915). Accord, Allder v. Jones, 98 Md. 101, 56 Atl. 487 (1903). Cf. Jones
v. Day, 102 Md. 99, 62 Atl. 364 (1905).
1 See Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 394, 16 Atl. 16, 18 (1888).
70 This obligation is made the same as to husband and wife by statute in
Maryland. See MD. CODE, Art. 45, sec. 7 (1939) ; MD. CODE Supp., Art. 93,
sec. 314; Art. 45, sec. 6 (1947).
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of a Maryland general power would not be permitted to
appoint to his surviving spouse.
For permitting the donee of this type of power to appoint
to his surviving spouse, one might argue that the donor
intended the donee to be permitted to make such an appoint-
ment because of close family relationship. 1 The donor
could have expressly forbidden the appointment, but did
not. Courts should not imply a limitation against an appoint-
ment to a spouse, as they do in the case of creditors, because
the intent of the donor to prevent such an appointment is
less clear than in the creditor situation. In addition one
might suggest that the decision in Balls v. Dampman72 was
based on a misinterpretation of the issue before the court,
and that although the rule as to creditors is too firmly em-
bedded in our law to be overruled, it should not be extended
to prevent the donee of a Maryland general power from
appointing to his surviving spouse.
The donee of a reserved general power, whether exer-
cisable by will or not, or of a power expressly exercisable
in favor of his estate or his creditors could appoint to his
surviving spouse, if these powers are treated as are true
general powers in other jurisdictions.
B. Where the Donee Fails to Appoint
to His Spouse
If a donee does not exercise a power in favor of his sur-
viving spouse, a question arises whether the surviving
spouse can reach the appointive property for dower in "land
held or owned" by the decedent during coverture73 or for
her statutory share of his estate at death.74 The courts in
Maryland approach the answer to the question differently
in the cases of "granted" and "reserved" powers.
n See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robertson, 65 A. 2d 292 (Md. 1949),(holding that the spouse of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust can reach
the income from such trust for alimony, although creditors cannot satisfy
their claims from either the income or the corpus of a spendthrift trust
in Maryland).
62f69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16 (1888).78 MD. CODE, Art. 45, sec. 7 (1939) ; MD. CODE SuPP., Art. 45, sec. 6 (1947).
7' MD. CODE, Art. 93, secs. 313-330 (1939) ; MD. CODE SupP., Art. 93, sec. 314,
(which provides what shares the surviving husband or wife shall take upon




1. Powers created by someone not
the donee - "Granted" Powers
The issue is whether the statutes which give a surviving
spouse dower in land or a share in land and personalty in-
clude powers of appointment created for the donee by
someone else.
For a spouse to have dower in lands, the decedent must
have been seized during coverture of an estate of inheri-
tance which the issue of the marriage might have taken as
heirs."' The donee has no estate in lands subject to a power
of appointment," hence his surviving spouse has no dower
right in such lands.
The spouse of a donee probably would not be permitted
to take a statutory share of property subject to any type of
power of appointment, because appointive assets are not a
part of the decedent's estate." However, if the donee has a
general power expressly exercisable in favor of his estate
or creditors, one might argue that his surviving spouse
should be permitted to take a statutory share in the appoin-
tive assets, because of the similarity of such a power to
ownership. Even in this situation it is likely that the power
would be held not to be a part of the decedent's estate with-
in the meaning of the statute.7 1
2. Powers reserved by the donee
The surviving spouse may take dower in, or a statutory
share of, property subject to a reserved power79 if the reser-
13 Nee Spangler v. Stanler, 1 Md. Ch. 36, 37 (1847). It will be remembered
that a reason for the use of the power of appointment was to defeat dower
rights of a surviving wife. See, e.g., Peay v. Peay, 2 Rich. Eq. 409 (S.C.
1845) ; Chinnubbee v. Nicks, 3 Porter 362 (Ala. 1836) ; Ray v. Pung, 5 Madd.
310 (1821), (all involving powers appendant which were held to give the
donee's surviving spouse no dower rights).
"See Maryland Mutual Benevolent Society v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 433,
22 Am. Rep. 52, 55 (1876).
"Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 161 Atl. 404 (1932).
" It would seem that the power expressly exercisable in favor of the
donee's estate or creditors would be treated in the same way as is the
reserved general power of appointment. Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
163 Md. 239, 161 AtI. 404 (1932), might then be a controlling authority to
prevent the surviving spouse from taking a statutory share of the appoin-
tive assets.
""Reserved power" includes the situation where the settlor transfers the
property to a strawman, who immediately reconveys to him. See e.g.,
Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 109, 131 AtL 40 (1925).
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vation was a "fraud" on her marital rights, 0 even though
she could not have reached the appointive property had
such a power been created by another. Although Maryland
courts have not consistently applied any single test for
"fraud" on marital rights, the one most often used is that if
the transferor either directly or indirectly retains posses-
sion of, receives the benefit from, or maintains control over
property he purports to transfer, then his conveyance is
merely colorable and constitutes a "fraud" on his spouse's
marital rights.8 '
In determining whether a "fraud" on marital rights has
been committed, an important element is the time the con-
tested reservation took place with reference to the mar-
riage. A case may receive different treatment if the trans-
action occurred before, but not in contemplation of the mar-
riage; in contemplation of marriage; or during the marriage.
a. Reservations before marriage
Where the donee reserves a power before, but not in con-
templation of marriage, there can be no "fraud" on a future
spouse's marital rights, and a surviving spouse could not
reach the appointive assets for dower or a statutory share.
b. Reservations in contemplation of marriage
Except in extreme cases,"2 it is unlikely that the reserva-
tion of any power in contemplation of marriage would be
held to violate the marital rights of a surviving spouse. In
determining the rights of a surviving spouse, such a power
See Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving
Spouses, 10 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1949) ; Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 139 (1936), for more complete discussions of defeating
the marital rights of surviving spouses. Sykes, supra, p. 11, suggests the
use of the phrase "violation of marital rights", rather than "fraud on
marital rights" and enumerates the factors a court may deem relevant in
each case.
See Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 105, 8 Atl. 744, 748 (1887).
See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 Atl. 597 (1904), (a voluntary
conveyance of all of a spouse's property on the eve of marriage with Intent
to defeat his widow's marital rights held a violation of those rights);
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 237, 181 N. E. 181 (1932). A secret
ante-nuptial conveyance made to avoid the attaching of marital rights may




would ordinarily be treated as though created by another
for the donee. 8
If the power was over realty, a court would more readily
hold the reservation a fraud on the surviving spouse's mari-
tal rights than if it were over personalty or leasehold prop-
erty, because inchoate dower vests at marriage but the right
to a statutory share of personalty arises only at the deced-
ent's death. 4 A life estate and a general power of appoint-
ment reserved by the donee would more likely be held a
conveyance in fraud of his surviving spouse's marital rights
than would the reservation of a life estate and a special
power. But the decision in each case would rest on the
merit of the claims of the surviving spouse in that particular
fact situation.85
c. Reservations after marriage
Even an absolute conveyance of all interest in an estate
of inheritance in land held after marriage will not defeat
the dower rights of a surviving spouse if she does not join
in the conveyance."6 A fortiori where any type of power or
other control is retained by a settlor over land, his wife may
still take dower in that land.
An absolute conveyance of personal or leasehold prop-
erty after marriage will defeat a surviving spouse's claims
to a statutory share of the assets conveyed." But the reser-
vation of a power is not an absolute conveyance. In Jaworski
v. Wisniewski,5 H. and W., incident to a separation, assigned
See supra, Section IV B 1, p. 34.
84 For an example of different treatments by the same jurisdiction of con-
veyances of land and of personalty where the transferring spouse retained
effective control, compare Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 181
N. E. 181 (1932), (involving a pre-marital conveyance of land which was
held fraudulent), with Redman v. Churchill, 230 Mass. 415, 119 N. E. 953
(1918), (involving a transfer of personalty during marriage by a husband
a year before his death, which was held not to be fraudulent).
1 See Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 484, 57 AtI. 597, 599 (1904). For fac-
tors which in a given case may tend to show a fraud on the surviving
spouse's marital rights, see !Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the
Rights of Surviving Spouses, 10 Md. L. Rev. 1, 11-15 (1949).8 See Spangler v. Stanler, 1 Md. Ch. 36, 37 (1847).
87 Poole v. Poole, 129 Md. 387, 99 Atl. 551 (1916). There is much con-
fusion as to when a transfer is "complete". See, e.g., Bullen v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A. 2d 581 (1939). 'See Sykes, Inter Vivos Trans-
fers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving Spouses, 10 Md. L. Rev. 1, n. 35
(1949).
149 Md. 109, 131 AtI. 40 (1925).
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leasehold property which they owned as tenants by the
entireties to X., who reassigned the leasehold to W. alone.
Nine years later, W. conveyed the leasehold to Y., who
immediately conveyed to her a life estate with full power
to dispose of the property during her life, a testamentary
power over the "life estate and remainder", and in default
of both powers to her sons. It was found as a fact that this
deed was made with the express purpose of defeating H.'s
marital interest. The Court of Appeals pointed out that W.
retained after the last conveyance all the powers she had
before it, and applying the control test 9 concluded that the
transfer was a fraud on H.'s right to a statutory share in the
estate of his decedent spouse.
There is a qualification to the control test as applied in
the Jaworski case. It was later held that a retention of
control would not cause the reservation of a power to
violate the surviving spouse's marital rights, if the arrange-
ment was reasonable in the circumstances of the particular
case.90 Thus a court can balance the equities of the claim-
ants in each case and grant a tailor-made decree to fit the
circumstances.9' Although this qualification tends to make
every conveyance of personalty during the marriage subject
to contest if the transferor does not relinquish full control
over the property conveyed, it appears to be the best judi-
cial solution to the problem of inter vivos conveyances in
fraud of marital rights.2
As stated in Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 105, 8 Atil. 744, 747 (1887).
1Whitehill v. Thiess, 161 Md. 657, 158 Atl. 347, 79 A. L. R. 373 (1932).
But cf. Bestry v. Dorn, 180 Md. 42, 22 A. 2d 552 (1941). In the Whitehill
case the court assumed -that there was intent to defeat the marital rights
of the surviving spouse, although there was no testimony on this point
(Md. at 660, Atl. at 348).
m Factors a court will consider in determining the equities of the claim-
ants are: (1) Who supplied the consideration for the original purchase of
the property. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Thiess, 161 Md. 657, 158 Atl. 347, 79
A. L. R. 373 (1932). (2) Intent to defeat the surviving spouse's marital
rights. See, e.g., Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A. 2d
581 -(1939). (3) Other property given the surviving spouse. See, e.g.,
Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A. 2d 465 (1944). (4) Whether the
surviving spouse and the decedent were happily married. See, e.g., Sturgis
v. Citizen's National Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 (1927). See Sykes,
Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving Spouses, 10
Md. L. Rev. 1, 11-15 (1949).
See Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs in Probate Law: A
Review, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 321, 331 (1947), where the author suggests that
the proper solution to inter vivos conveyances in fraud of marital rights is




V. TAXATION OF PowE~s OF APPOINTMENT
Taxation of powers has become the most important seg-
ment of the law of powers of appointment in the United
States, because of the continued usefulness of this type of
disposition, the increasingly complex provisions in the
Revenue Acts relating to powers, and higher tax rates. A
useful method of discussing coherently the taxation of
powers, maintaining the unity of treatment which adequate
consideration of the field requires, is the construction of a
simple estate plan. Through detailed analysis of the prob-
lems arising in the plan used in this Section, a thumb-nail
sketch of the more important aspects of the taxation of
powers of appointment will be presented for the benefit of
the Maryland estate planner.
Primary attention is given to the problems encountered
in drafting a provision for a surviving spouse which it is
desired will achieve the full benefit of the marital deduction
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Next, the tax
effects of certain types of powers reserved in inter vivos
conveyances will be discussed. Finally, the taxation in the
donee's estate of powers of appointment given the donee by
another will be considered.
A. Pertinent Facts about Mr. H.
Assume that Mr. H. steps into your office and says that
he wants you to draw a new will for him. In response to
your questions, he gives you the following information :1
1. Members of his family
H. is fifty-eight years old, and was in good health two
months ago when he last was examined by a physician.
He is happily married to his first wife, W., who is fifty-six
years old and in good health. H. is W.'s first husband..
The three children born of the marriage are living and
are happily married. The eldest child, A., is thirty years
"The facts recited here may be far from typical. They have been chosen
merely to make possible a detailed analysis of the tax aspects of powers.
Of course, more information would be essential if a will were actually being
drafted for Mr. H.; ordinarily, estate plans should be made for the other
members of his family.
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old, and his wife is twenty-four. They have one child, but
will probably have several more. The second child B., is
twenty-seven. He and his wife, who is twenty-four, have
one child, and they expect to have more children. B. has a
slight nervous condition, the result of war experiences, but
it is not serious, and doctors believe he has many years of
useful life ahead of him if he does not overwork. The
youngest child, C. (a daughter), is twenty-five and has two
children. Her husband is thirty-two years old. C. and her
husband expect another child shortly.
H.'s only other relative is a widowed sister forty-five
years of age, whose husband died one year ago after a pro-
tracted illness. H. has been giving her financial aid for the
past several years.
2. Domicil
All members of the family live in and around Baltimore,
Maryland, where H.'s business is located, except for C. and
her husband, who live in New York City.
3. Family income and property
H. is president of a furniture manufacturing corporation
which he and his present business associate founded in 1935.
His salary as president of the company is $35,000 per year.
H. also owns 5,000 shares of $10.00 par common stock in the
company which has paid a dollar per share for the last five
years. H.'s associate owns 5,000 shares of the common, and
the remaining 1,000 shares are distributed among employees
of the company. The book value of this stock is now $40.00
per share. H. owns $200,000 worth of stocks and bonds listed
on the New York Exchange with an average yearly income
therefrom of $10,000 per year. H. owns a home in Baltimore
County which is valued at $60,000, for which H. furnished
all of the consideration. The furnishings of the home and
other miscellaneous assets belonging to H. total $20,000.
In addition, H. has taken out life-insurance to the amount
of $100,000, payable at his death to W., with an option in
W. to leave the money with the company and take interest
19511
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
or interest plus parts of the principal. Finally, H. is the life
tenant and donee of a power of appointment in realty
worth $90,000 which his father left him when he died in
1939. The power provides that H. may appoint as he sees
fit by will, and in default of appointment to A., B., and C.
as tenants in common. The rent from this property, at
present used as a parking lot, is $5,000 per year.
W. owns $25,000 worth of stock sold on the New York
Stock Exchange, the average income from which is $1,500
per year.
C.'s husband, A. and B. all have good jobs. C.'s hus-
band works for a large New York chemical company with
promise for future advancement. His salary is $15,000, and
he expects to inherit about $200,000 worth of property from
his parents. A. and B. work in the furniture company and
intend to continue in the business when H. retires. H.'s
business associate has only one son, who is studying law,
and expects to practice in California. It is therefore likely
that after the older men retire A. and B. will be running the
furniture business. They have both been working in the
company since they were discharged from the Navy in 1945,
and last year each drew a salary of $7,000.
H.'s widowed sister has a position with a store selling
women's clothing from which she earns about $4,000 per
year. H. gave her $50,000 worth of stocks and bonds in 1946,
from which she has an average income of $2,000.
4. Prior gifts and will
The only gifts H. has made other than small sums under
$3,000 per year given his sister, wife, and children was the
1946 gift of $50,000 to his sister.
H. made a will in 1943, revoking all prior wills, wherein
he left $120,000 worth of property to W. for life (exclusive
of life insurance), with a special power of appointment
among his three children, and in default of appointment to
them equally. The residue was to be used to pay debts,
taxes, administration expenses, etc., and what was left
should go to H.'s sister.
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5. H.'s plans of disposition
Since he made his last will in 1943 H. has become
wealthier and his dispositive plans have changed. He states
that a further reason for his making a new will is to mini-
mize his estate taxes as much as he can, utilizing the marital
deduction provisions of the new tax laws.
H. wishes to leave W. more than she would have been
given by his 1943 will and also to provide more generously
for his widowed sister. The stock in the furniture company
he wants given to A. and B. Because he feels that C. will
be taken care of from other sources, she is to receive
secondary consideration, but he does wish her to be given
some property if it is practical concurrent with his other
dispositions.94
B. The Marital Deduction
In considering what provisions H. should make for W.,
attention is directed towards computing the marital deduc-
tion, various mechanical problems which arise when at-
tempting to secure the full marital deduction, and drafting
a life estate and a power of appointment which qualify for
the marital deduction.
1. Computation of the marital deduction
A testator may give his surviving spouse95 up to one-half
of his adjusted gross estate free of estate tax." The adjusted
gross estate of a decedent is his gross estate97 less deduc-
tions for funeral expenses, administration expenses, debts,
" Assumptions will be made to vary or to add to these facts as exposition
progresses.
"For convenience, reference hereafter will be to the surviving spouse as
"wife" and to the decedent or testator as "husband", but the estate of either
the husband or wife may qualify for the marital deduction. See U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a(a).
"This result is accomplished by permitting a deduction equivalent to one-
half of the husband's adjusted gross estate. The general provisions appear
In INT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, secs. 81.47a-81.47d.
For an estate to qualify for the marital deduction, the decedent must die
after December 31, 1947; the decedent must have been a citizen or resident
of the United States, although his surviving spouse need not be. See U. S.
Treas. Reg. 105. sec. 81.47a(a).
"Property of a decedent which is included in his gross estate is described
in INT. REv. CODE, sec. 811; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, secs. 81.13-81.28.
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unpaid mortgages and allowances for dependents permitted
by state law."
Applying these rules to H.'s present estate, the first prob-
lem is to determine what would be included in his gross
estate if he died immediately. Assume that H. has exercised
or released inter vivos the power of appointment (item 1)
left him by his father.9 9 This eliminates $90,000 from his
gross estate. The furniture company stock (item 2), mis-
cellaneous stocks and bonds (item 3), the house and grounds
(item 4), and miscellaneous assets (item 5) are owned out-
right by the decedent at the time of his death, hence are
part of his estate for tax purposes.100 The life insurance
(item 6) is also part of H.'s estate, because by hypothesis
he paid the premiums. 1'
If funeral expenses, administration expenses, debts, and
dependents' allowances (H. has no unpaid mortgages)
amount to $60,000, the following computation can be made:
G ross estate .................................. $580,000
Administration expenses, etc..... 60,000
Adjusted gross estate .................. $520,000
98INT. REV. CODE, sees. 812(e)(2)(A) and 812(b). This treatment will
not consider the marital deduction as operative in estates where the
decedent and his spouse own community property. See INT. REV. CODE, see.
812(e) (2) (B) ; U. -S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47d(b) ; Taylor, Taxation of
Community Property Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 87 TRuSTS & ESTATES
27 (1948) ; Winstead, Constitutionality of Federal Estate Taxation of Com-
munity Property, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 34 (1945), (discussing the application of
INT. REV. CODE, see. 811(e)2, since repealed).
" A tabular summary of the assets which would be included in H.'s estate
If he died tomorrow and the average yearly income which these assets
have produced follows:
Asset Value Income
1. Appointive property ................ $ 90,000 $ 5,000
2. Family furniture company stock ..... 200,000 5,000
3. Miscellaneous stocks and bonds ...... 200,000 10,000
4. House and grounds .................. 60,000 ......
5. Miscellaneous assets ................ 20,000 ......
6. Life insurance ..................... 100,000 ......
TOTAL ............ $670,000
The disposition of the power of appointment is discussed infra, Section V D.
0 INT. REv. CODE, sec. 811(a), (b) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sees. 81.13, 81.14.
If the decedent paid the premiums on life insurance or possessed at his
death any incidents of ownership, the proceeds of the policy are included in
his gross estate. INT. REv. CODE, sec. 811(g) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sees.
81.25, 81.27. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.28 (valuation of insurance).
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One-half of H.'s adjusted gross estate is $260,000, which is
the maximum sum H. may give W. by will free of any tax
on his estate.
Assuming that H. takes the full marital deduction avail-
able to him, his tax will be computed as follows:
Gross estate ............ $580,000
Less: Administration ex-





Tax payable .... $37,02010
If H. does not take any marital deduction, the tax pay-
able on the estate will be $110,740.114 Thus the marital
deduction saves H.'s estate $73,720 in Federal Estate Taxes.
101 In H.'s case the $40,000 is a charitable gift, deductible by INT. REV.
CODE, sec. 812(d) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, secs. 81.44-81.46. In general, if H.
had any property in his estate which formed a part of the gross estate of
someone who died within five years prior to H. or property transferred to
him by gift, and the estate or gift -taxes were paid on such property, then
the value of this property may be deducted from H.'s gross estate. INT. REV.
CODE, sec. 812(c) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, see. 81.41.
"a INT. REV. CODE, sees. 810, 935; U. !S. Treas. Reg. 105, secs. 81.6, 81.7.
H.'s gross basic tax is computed after deducting the $100,000 exemption.
INT. REV. CODE 812(a). The gross basic estate tax on H.'s net estate of$120,000 is $2,100. H.'s total gross tax is computed after deducting the
$60,000 exemption. INT. REV. CODE, sec. 935(c). The total gross estate tax
on H.'s net estate of $160,000 is $38,700. Subtract the gross basic estate tax
from the total gross estate tax to find the gross additional estate tax
($38,700-$2,100=$36,600). The net additional estate tax is computed by
deducting from the gross additional estate tax any credits for gift taxes
paid on assets included in the decedent's gross estate. INT. REV. CODE, sec.
936(b). Here, there is no gift tax credit, so the gross additional estate tax
equals the net additional estate tax. The net basic estate tax is computed
by deducting any gift tax credit (INT. REV. CODE, sec. 813(a)) and up to
80% of credit for any state inheritance, legacy, or estate taxes actually paid
(INT. REV. CODE, sec. 813(b)) from the gross basic estate tax ($2,100-$1,680=$420). To find the net tax payable, add the net basic estate tax to
the net additional estate tax ($36,600+$420=$37,020).
' See supra, n. 103. Without the marital deduction H.'s net estate before
any exemptions is $480,000. After taking the $100,000 exemption permitted
in computing the basic estate tax, H.'s gross basic estate tax is $11,700.
After taking the $60,000 exemption permitted in computing the additional
estate tax, H.'s total gross estate tax is $120,100. His gross additional
estate tax is $108,400 ($120,100-$11,700=$108,400), which is also H.'s net
additional estate tax because there is no gift tax credit. The net basic tax
is found by deducting the 80% credit for state taxes paid ($11,700-$9,360=
$2,340). Add the net basic tax to the net additional tax to compute the total
tax payable ($2,340+$108,400=$110,740).
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2. Mechanical problems in drafting
marital deduction provisions
There are several important tax problems with which
the estate planner is faced when drafting a devise or be-
quest to a surviving spouse which it is desired will qualify
for the marital deduction. The first question he must an-
swer is what property is best suited for such a gift. The
estate planner must determine whether some section of
the Internal Revenue Code would prevent all or part of the
property he has found most suitable for the surviving
spouse from qualifying for the marital deduction. Another
important problem facing the estate planner is whether he
should include a common disaster clause in his provision
for the surviving spouse. He should also decide how to
draft the gift to the surviving spouse so that she will receive
exactly one-half of her husband's estate.0 5
a. Property best suited for a gift to
the surviving spouse
Normally, a husband wishes his wife to be financially
independent after his death.0 6 Assuming that the wife
does not own a substantial amount of property herself and
will not receive property from other sources, then assets
which produce a steady yearly income are well suited for
the purpose.' In Mr. H.'s estate, the stocks and bonds
(item 3) earn a steady income at the present time. The
10 These are but a few of the important problems created by the marital
deduction provisions. For more complete treatment see Casner, Estate
Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1949) ;
Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948 - The Regulations,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949) ; Vaughn, Estate and Gift Ta. Amendments of
the Revenue Act of 1948, 27 N. C. L. Rev. 18 (1948).
"0 This section does not consider the case of the husband who wishes to
leave his wife as little as possible by will. For effective methods of disin-
heriting a spouse, see supra, Section IV B, p. 33: Sykes, Inter Vivos Trans-
fera in Violation of the Rights of Surviving Spouses, 10 Md. L. Rev. 1
(1949) ; Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 139 (1936).
I" If the husband does not have assets which will supply enough income
to support his surviving wife, it may be necessary for him to give property
outright to his wife to allow her to consume it as she needs the money. This
type of disposition has the disadvantage that if the surviving spouse lives
long enough after her husband dies she will consume all of the assets and
have nothing left when she needs the income most. In a situation, such as
that of H., where there Is enough income to support W.. a trust with a
power of appointment is the best type of disposition. Barring catastrophes,
most of the corpus will probably pass to H.'s descendants on W.'s death.
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insurance proceeds (item 6) may be safely invested to
secure a steady yearly income to W. Of course, if there
were no assets such as these in his estate, H. could direct
that other assets in his estate be sold and the proceeds of
the sale invested for his wife by the trustees.
b. Unidentified assets, liens, and taxes
If the provision for a surviving spouse is not a specific
devise or bequest and might include assets or the proceeds
from assets which would not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion were they given directly to the surviving spouse, then
the marital deduction is reduced by the amount of these
assets in the decedent's gross estate.' °8 For example, sup-
pose H. had a twenty year lease, valued at $60,000 in his
gross estate at death and left $260,000, which was one-half
of his adjusted gross estate to W. without specifically dis-
posing of the lease to anyone else. The amount of the mari-
tal deduction (ordinarily the $260,000) would be reduced
by the value of the lease, even though W. did not actually
receive the leasehold property.10 9 The marital deduction
allowed for H.'s estate would be $200,000.
But it is surprisingly simple to avoid this result. The
leasehold may be specifically devised to someone other than
the surviving spouse, or the surviving spouse may be given
a specific or demonstrative gift from assets other than the
lease. If either of these is done in the example above, the
full marital deduction of $260,000 will be allowed. Actually
this problem does not arise in planning H.'s estate, because
he has no assets to which the rule applies.
The marital deduction will also be reduced by the
amount of any liens on the property or by federal estate or
Maryland state inheritance taxes which are paid from the
INT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) (1) (C) :
"Where the assets (included in the decedent's gross estate) out of
which, or the proceeds of which, an interest passing to the surviving
spouse may be satisfied include a particular asset or assets with respect
to which no deduction would be allowed if such asset or assets passed
from the decedent to such spouse, then the value of such interest passing
to such spouse shall .. .be reduced by the aggregate value of such
particular assets."
See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47b (f).
This rule applies to any "nondeductible interest" or the proceeds there-
from. INT. REv. CODE, sec. 812(e) (1) (B) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47b.
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assets given to the surviving spouse." Application of this
rule can be anticipated or avoided by either directing the
executor to pay all liens and taxes on property given the
surviving spouse out of general funds of the estate, or by
giving the surviving spouse an amount of property which,
when reduced by taxes and encumbrances will be of a value
equal to the maximum amount of property which would
qualify for the marital deduction. This rule must be taken
into account when planning the marital deduction pro-
visions for the estate of Mr. H.
c. Common disaster clause
It is normally wise to include some form of common dis-
aster clause"' in the marital deduction provision for a sur-
viving spouse, particularly if the testator resides in Mary-
land. The Internal Revenue Code specifically provides that
the inclusion of a condition of survivorship for a period of
up to six months after the death of the decedent will not
prevent the decedent's estate from taking the full marital
deduction."2
'10 INT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) (1) (E) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47c-
(b), (c).
I" "Common disaster" clause, as the term is here used, means any testa-
mentary provision for the passage of property in case both the legatee or
devisee and the testator die in the same catastrophe in such a way that
proof of one surviving the other is impossible. The provision may require
that the legatee or devisee must survive the testator by some period of time,
such as thirty days, in order to receive the property; it may state that
where both parties die in a common disaster, and proof that one survived
the other is unavailable, the devise or legacy shall be void; or the provision
may create a presumption that one party survived the other in case both
died in a common disaster and proof of survival is impossible. It is par-
ticularly important to insert some form of common disaster clause where
devises or legacies are to pass between spouses, if the result of a simultane-
ous death will be disadvantageous to their dispositive plans, because of the
fact that the close association of spouses makes death in a common disaster
more than a mere possibility. See Watkins. Simultaneous Death and the
Marital Deduction, 1949 Ins. L. J. 793 (1949) ; Wyshak, Common Disaster
Clauses in Estate Planning, 34 Mass. L. Q. 22 (1949).
Is tNT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) (1) (D) :
"... an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be con-
sidered as an interest which will terminate or fail upon the death of
such spouse if - (i) such death will cause a termination or failure of
such interest only if it occurs within a period not exceeding six months
after the decedent's death, or only if it occurs as a result of a common
disaster resulting in the death of the decedent and the surviving spouse,
or only if it occurs in the case of either such event; and (ii) such termi-
nation or failure does not in fact occur."
See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47b(d). Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec.
81.47a (a), infra, n. 116.
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If a surviving spouse had -little property of her own,
taxes and other expenses would be lower if the marital
deduction were allowed and the property passed through
both the husband's and the wife's estate."3 In the absence
of some form of common disaster provision, the property
would pass through the estates of both the husband and
the wife.'14 But there is some question as to whether the
marital deduction would be permitted to be taken by the
husband's estate. The Internal Revenue Code provides for
the marital deduction where the wife survives and the
Regulations require the executor of the decedent to prove
she did survive. 115 This proof may be supplied by a state
118 If H. and W. die in a common disaster and there is no proof that either
survived, H.'s estate tax will be $37,020, if he has the same property he
now owns, but exercises or releases the power (item 1, 8upra, n. 99) during
his life so that it is not included in his gross estate for tax purposes.
W.'s estate will include the $260,000 her husband gives her plus the $25,000
worth of stock. Both estates could be administered together, thus lowering
W.'s administration expenses. Assuming that her administration expenses,
debts, charitable gifts and other deductions are $30,000, her net estate before
any exemptions will be $255,000. The total federal tax payable is $47,480,
if Maryland inheritance and estate taxes are equal to 80% of the federal
gross basic estate tax. Both estates will pay an aggregate of $84,500 in
federal estate taxes if the marital deduction is taken. The aggregate federal
estate tax payable if the property does not pass to W. will be $110,740, all
payable by H.'s estate, because W.'s estate of $25,000 is exempt, allowing
for state inheritance and estate taxes and administration expenses. But
the true picture cannot be seen unless the administration expenses and state
taxes are added back into the total payments the estates must pay in each
case:
Property passes Property does not
to W. pass to W.
Federal Taxes ................ $ 84,220 $110,740
State taxes ................... 3,400 9,610
Administration expenses ....... 80,000 62,000
TOTALS ............ $167,620 $182,350
This simple computation will show at what point money will be saved by
a provision that property will not pass to the surviving spouse if both the
husband and wife die in a common disaster. See MD. CODE, Art. 81, Sec. 109
(1939) ; MID. CODE Supp., Art. 81, Secs. 110-111 (1947) ; Cf. Connor v. O'Hara,
53 A. 2d 33 (Md. 1947), (holding that property passing by the exercise of
a power of appointment is not subject to inheritance tax). But see MD. CODE,
Art. 62A (1939). See supra, n. 103.
n MD. CODE Supp., Art. 35, sec. 89 (1947), superseding MD. CODE, Art. 35,
sec. 89 (1939), (which provided for a presumption of survivorship) provides:
"Where the title to property . . . depends upon priority of death and
there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than
simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if
he had survived ..." (except in the case of joint tenants, tenants by
the entireties. etc.).
"5U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a (a), provides in part:
"In order to obtain the marital deduction with respect to any prop-
erty interest the executor must establish the following facts: (1) That
the decedent was survived by his spouse; (2) That such property in-
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law establishing a presumption of survivorship, if both
spouses die in a common disaster. The Maryland statute
creates no presumption of survivorship, but speaks in terms
of property passing."6 A logical decision would of course
be that for tax purposes property passing under the Mary-
land statute is equivalent to a presumption of survivorship
supplied by the statutes in other states. But in the absence
of cases on this point, it is better to provide in the will that
the spouse to whom the property shall pass will be pre-
sumed to survive if both spouses die in a common dis-
aster and proof that one survived longer than the other is
impossible.
If a spouse has substantial property of her own, yet
her husband wishes to leave her part of his estate because
he believes her own property will be insufficient to support
her adequately, then a clause requiring the spouse to sur-
vive up to six months after the decedent's death should be
inserted in the marital deduction provision.'1'
In drafting a common disaster clause for H.'s bequest to
W. a substantial tax saving would be insured by a clause
implying survivorship in W. in case both die in a common
disaster.
d. Drafting
There are two basic ways in which an estate planner can
draft a marital deduction provision so that the wife will
receive exactly one-half of her husband's estate. He can
provide that the surviving spouse shall receive a given
amount of money which is equivalent. to the maximum
marital deduction which his estate would receive if the
testator died at this moment, or he can provide that the
terest passed from the decedent to such spouse ... Where the order of
deaths of the decedent and his spouse cannot be established by proof,
a presumption (whether supplied by local law, the decedent's will, or
otherwise) that the decedent was survived by his spouse will be recog-
nized as satisfying requirement (1) ...
See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47e.
1" See supra, n. 114.
12 The costs, including taxes, to both estates would be higher if the prop-
erty passed to the wife, because her net estate would be greater than the
husband's. The optimum position in this case is for both net estates to be
equal. See 8upra, n. 113.
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surviving spouse shall receive property equivalent to one-
half of the testator's adjusted gross estate.118
If a set amount is given the surviving spouse, she may
agree to disclaim that portion of the sum which is in excess
of the marital deduction."' Difficulty may be encountered
if the surviving spouse is greedy or is not on friendly terms
with her husband and refuses to disclaim the excess. But
this method is advantageous in that if the assets of a testa-
tor diminish between the execution of the will and his
death, his surviving spouse still will receive assets sufficient
to support her.
A provision for the surviving spouse of one-half of the
adjusted gross estate of the testator has the advantage of
needing no cooperation from the surviving spouse if the
testator is anxious to give her an amount exactly equal to
the marital deduction. But such a provision has the dis-
advantages that it may not provide the surviving spouse
with sufficient funds to support her adequately if the testa-
tor's assets diminish substantially between the execution
of the will and his death, and that it will be difficult to
compute if taxes on the gift to the surviving spouse are not
paid from general funds of the estate.120
The estate planner should point out to H. the advantages
and disadvantages of each type of clause, so that he can
choose which to use in his will. The facts that the marriage
has been a happy one and that $260,000 properly invested
will be sufficient to allow W. to live in the manner to which
she has been accustomed indicate that H. would probably
wish to give her $260,000 worth of assets without reference
to the adjusted gross estate.
no A combination of these methods to incorporate the benefits of each is
feasible, but complicated. It may be worthwhile to use such a combination
in some circumstances, but it is not necessary in H.'s estate.
U The renunciation by a surviving spouse causes the property renounced
to pass for tax purposes directly to those entitled to receive it as a result
of such renunciation. INT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) (4) (A)-. But see INT. REv.
CODE, sec. 812(e) (4) (B). U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a(e). No gift tax
is payable on such a disclaimer. INT. REv. CODE, sec. 812(e) (4) (A.) ; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 81.47a (e).
1w The amount of the bequest to the surviving spouse and taxes which are
payable thereon are both unknown quantities. See Casner, Estate Planning
Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 435 (1949).
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3. Interests which qualify for the
marital deduction
One type of interest which may qualify for the marital
deduction is a life estate in trust with a power to appoint
the remainder free of the trust.'21
Both the life estate and the power must satisfy certain
conditions before the marital deduction will be allowed.
First, the life estate must be in trust. Second, the sur-
viving spouse must be entitled to receive all the income
from the corpus during her life. Third, the income must be
payable annually or at more frequent intervals. Fourth, the
surviving spouse must be permitted to appoint all of the
corpus free of trust. Fifth, the power must be exercisable
in favor of herself or her estate (both), and may, but need
not be exercisable in favor of others. Sixth, although some-
one other than the spouse may have a power over the cor-
pus, such a power must be exercised only in favor of the
surviving spouse. Seventh, the surviving spouse must be
permitted to exercise the power by herself. Eighth, the
power must be exercisable by the surviving spouse in all
events.'22
In applying these rules to the estate of Mr. H. to deter-
mine what type of life estate and power he should give his
wife, assume that he wishes to establish by will a trust of
$160,000 of the stocks and bonds he owns at the present
time, with his two sons, A. and B., and W. as co-trustees.123
H. wants all of the income to be payable to W. in quarterly
installments. He may wish to include a power in the trus-
tees to invade corpus for the benefit of W. 124 This power
would not prevent the property from achieving the full
m An absolute bequest or devise to the surviving spouse would also qualify
for the marital deduction in the estate of the decedent, so long as the gift
is not of a terminable interest. INT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) (1) (B) ; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47b.
M INT. REV. CODE, sec. 812(e) (1) (F) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a (c).
The provisions as to a life insurance trust with a power of appointment are
substantially the same. INT. REV. CODE, see. 812(e) (1) (G) ; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a (d).
Item 3, 8upra, n. 99.
"A This is always a wise provision, because it permits a surviving spouse




marital deduction, because it is exercisable solely for the
benefit of his surviving spouse.
H. should give W. a power of appointment exercisable
by deed or will. If he uses general language in creating the
power, the property would probably not qualify for the
marital deduction because this type of power has been con-
strued by the Maryland courts to include an implied limita-
tion that the donee may not appoint for her own benefit.'25
State law would be applied to determine to whom W. could
appoint. 2 ' Therefore H. must include a clause making the
power specifically exercisable in favor of W. or her estate.
If such a specific permission is included, there seems to be
no reason why a Maryland court will not allow W. to
appoint to her own estate if she wishes to do so, and the
property will qualify for the marital deduction.
To insure that the property would go to those whom he
wanted to receive it in the absence of an appointment by
W., H. should include a clause in default of appointment.
H. may change the provisions of the life insurance to
have the company pay W. yearly installments of corpus
and interest with a power of appointment by deed or will.'27
Under present law W. will pay no income tax on the pay-
ments of corpus and interest, although she will pay income
tax on any interest she receives, if the corpus is left in-
vested with the insurance company after H.'s death, and
the company pays W. the interest unmixed with portions
of the principal. 12 8
C. Powers Reserved Inter Vivos
The possibility that H. may desire to minimize his estate
taxes by making inter vivos conveyances of some of the
property he now owns leads to an exploration of how much
control he may retain over assets so conveyed. An absolute
transfer of part of the property he owns would, of course,
1 See Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 394, 16 Atl. 16, 18 (1888). Cf. Leser
v. Burnet, 46 F. 2d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1931). See supra, Section III, p. 22.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a(c).
INT. Rnv. CODE. sec. 812(e) (1) (G) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.47a(d).
See Menard, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax, 27 N. C. L. REV. 43,
51 (1948).




take it out of his estate entirely.29 But if H. retains some
control over the assets transferred, it is likely that they will
be part of his estate for tax purposes. Furthermore, certain
gift and income tax effects of reserving powers should be
brought to H.'s attention.
Assets subject to a reserved power of appointment are
taxed by those sections of the Internal Revenue Code which
include property in the settlor's estate because he has re-
tained control after a transfer, as well as by the sections
taxing powers of appointment in the donee's estate.'8 0
Suppose that H. wishes to create a trust of his property
during his life and at the same time to retain a power over
the trust so that he may control it until his death. The vari-
ations in types of power he might reserve are limited only
by the ingenuity of the draftsman. But the more usual
types of powers, to which this discussion will be limited,
are subject to generic subdivision into three categories:
powers to revoke or terminate, powers to alter or amend,
and powers which are merely managerial.
1. Powers to revoke or terminate
The law as to the taxation of reserved powers to revoke
or terminate is today relatively settled. The reservation
of this type of power, either directly or indirectly, 3' causes
10 Unless the transfer was made in contemplation of, or to take effect at,
death. INT. REV. CODE, sec. 811(c) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sees. 81.15, 81.21.
In general, the transfers discussed in this Section would be treated in the
same fashion if the settlor made himself a trustee with the powers here
discussed, or if the trustee was vested with the powers here discussed and
the settlor retained control of the trustee.
1w See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, see. 81.19, which provides in part: "(sec.
811 (c) (1) (B)) of the Internal Revenue Code covers, in the main, transfers
to which also apply the provisions of certain other subsections of section
811." A reserved power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate by the de-
cedent alone or in conjunction with another person will be subject to taxa-
tion in the settlor's estate by operation of section 811(d) and U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, sec. 81.20; A reserved power of appointment, with certain excep-
tions, will be subject to taxation in the settlor's estate by operation of sec-
tion 811 (f) and U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24.
M INT. REv. CODE, sec. 811(d) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, see. 81.20. The addi-
tional language in sec. 811(d) (1) is considered merely to express the law
as it existed prior to the enactment of this provision, except for the state-
ment, "without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired
such power" in the situation where the settlor did not receive the power at
the time he made the transfer. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.20(a).
The change in language was prompted by the decision in White v. Poor, 296
U. S. 98, 56 S. Ct. 66 (1935), (Settlor reappointed Trustee held not to have
reserved a power, even though she had originally made herself a trustee
at the time of the transfer to the trust). Note that section 811 (d) does not
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so much of the property as is subject to the power to be
taxed in the settlor's estate,132 whether or not the power is
exercised. 18 3 Even a power to revoke or terminate implied
by state law may cause appointive assets to be taxed in
the settlor's estate. 3 4
If the settlor reserves a power to revoke or terminate
when making a transfer in trust, then no gift tax is payable
on that transfer. But the settlor must pay a gift tax on the
corpus when he releases the power to revoke.' 3 He must
pay a gift tax on the income given to the beneficiary each
year, in spite of the fact that it does not pass through the
settlor's hands. 36
If the transferor reserves the power to revoke or termi-
nate exercisable by himself or in conjunction with another
who has no adverse interest'37 in the assets, then the trans-
feror must also pay the income tax on the earnings of the
trust.38
2. Power to alter or amend
Where the settlor reserves a power to alter or amend
the trust, the value of as much of the assets as are subject
to the power is included in his gross estate for tax pur-
apply if the power is exercisable only with the consent of all of the in-
terested parties, whether their interests are vested or contingent. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.20(b) (3). See, e.g., Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S.
93, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
1E.g, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929),
(decided under the Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 STAT. 227, the applicable
provisions of which are now part of INT. REV. CODE, sec. 811(d) (2)) ; U. S.
v. Stark, 32 F. 2d 453 (6th Cir 1929), (only those assets subject to a power
of revocation are included In the settlors gross estate for tax purposes).
A power of revocation causes appointive assets to be taxed In the settlor's
gross estate even where the only result of the revocation Is acceleration of
the remainders. Commissioner v. Holmes' Estate, 326 U. S. 480, 66 S. Ct.
257 (1946). See supra, n. 130.
aMcCaughn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 34 F. 2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1929).
lVaccaro v. U. S., 149 F. 2d 1014 (5th Cir. 194-5) : Howard v. U. S., 125
F. 2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Estate of Keiffer, 44 B. T. A. 1265, Dec. 12045
(1941), petition for review dismisscd on motion (5th Cir. 1942). Contra:
Newhall v. Casey, 18 F. 2d 447 (D. C. Mass 1927) ; Estate of May, 8 T. C.
1099, Dec. 15792 (1947).
2E.g., Burnet v. Gugenhelm, 288 IT. S. 280. 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933), (decided
under the 1924 gift tax statute. which was repealed the next year). INT.
REv. CODE, sec. 1000; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, see. 86.3.
IOU. S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 86.3. Cf. Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F. 2d
913 (9th Cir. 1942).
u7 The bare legal interest of a trustee by Itself is not a substantial adverse
Interest. Relnecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 53 S. Ct. 570 (1933) ; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, secs. 29.166-1, 29.166-2(b).
'MINT. REV. CODE, sec. 166; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, secs. 29.166-1, 29.166-2.
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poses." 9 A power to alter or amend has been described as
any power which permits the settlor to make a substantial
change in the enjoyment of the property. 4 °
This rule has been inconsistently applied by the courts,
so it is wise in drafting inter vivos transfers for H. to leave
out any power which resembles a power to change the
beneficial enjoyment of the trust. For example, a power to
change the portions of trust income several beneficiaries
shall receive has been held to be a power to make a sub-
stantial change in enjoyment, but a power to determine
whether assets received by a trust are income or principal
has been held to be a managerial power.''
As in the situation where the settlor reserves a power
to revoke the trust, no gift tax is payable upon the creation
of a trust if a power to alter or amend is reserved to the
settlor. A gift tax on the corpus is payable upon the release
of such a reserved power.142 Each installment of income to
the beneficiary is considered a gift to him from the settlor,
so the settlor must pay a gift tax on such installments as
they are paid. 43
If a power to alter or amend is exercisable by the settlor
alone or by the settlor in conjunction with another who does
not have a substantial adverse interest, the settlor must pay
the income tax on the trust income.'44
3. Powers which are managerial
The line drawn between the ordinary power to alter or
amend and the managerial power is far from clear. But
mE.g., Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933) ; Dravo
v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 309, Dec. 10785 (1939). See supra, n. 130.
1,0 Estate of Storer, 41 B. T. A. 1156, Dec. 11101 (1940).
14 Powers to change portions: Commissioner v. Bridgeport City Trust Co.,
124 F. 2d 48 (2nd Cir. 1941), cert. den. 316 U. S. 672 (1942). Cf. Estate of
Spaulding, 3 T. C. M. 294, Dec. 13845(M) (1944), petition for review dis-
missed nolle pros, (1st Cir. 1945). Powers to allocate increment to corpus
or income: Estate of Fiske, 5 T. C. M. 42, Dec. 14964(M) (1946). Contra
(in effect) : Estate of Hager. 5 T. C. M. 972, Dec. 15480(M) (1946).
1" Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939). INT. REv. CODE,
sec. 1000; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 86.3.
I" Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F. 2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942) ; INT. REV. CODE,
sec. 1000; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 86.3. See H. R. Rep. No. 1079, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1943). Cf. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F. 2d 102
(2nd Cir. 1946), cert. den. 326 U. S. 796 (1946).
I"4 The settlor is taxed under INT. REv. CODE, sec. 22(a) ; Commissioner v.
Buck, 120 F. 2d 775 (2nd Cir. 1941). Cf. Richardson v. Commissioner, 121
F. 2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1941).
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there are certain types of powers which are clearly man-
agerial in nature and therefore are not subject to taxation
in the settlor's estate.
A right reserved by the settlor to supervise the trustee
in making investments is a managerial power, hence does
not cause the corpus of the trust to be taxed in the settlor's
estate.145 The same is true where the settlor reserves a
power to modify, alter, or amend, specifically excluding the
power to change any beneficial interest. 146
Conflicting decisions make it difficult to determine
whether a power to designate that assets received by a trust
shall be income or corpus is a managerial power or a power
to alter or amend.'47 The better rule appears to be that
this is a power to alter or amend and that the assets subject
to such a power are part of the settlor's estate for tax pur-
poses. Under the power to allocate to income or corpus,
if the settlor has the power to allocate all increment not
clearly income to principal, or to designate all assets re-
ceived by the trust as income, then in effect he increases
the beneficial interest of the remainderman or of the life
beneficiary when he exercises the power.
Where a settlor makes a transfer reserving a managerial
power, he must pay a gift tax on the corpus when the trans-
fer is made, because the gift is complete at that time.
Reservation of such a power would not cause the income
from the trust to be taxable to the settlor.148
H. probably would not wish to transfer subject to a
reserved power any of the property he now owns. However,
he would be perfectly safe in giving some of his property
to members of his family, because of the probability that
they would handle the property as H. suggested in the
u5 Estate of Johnston, 2 T. C. M. 299, Dec. 13310(M) (1943), petition for
review di8missed on stipulation8 (6th Cir. 1944). Cf. Fifth Avenue Bank v.
Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (D. C., E. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Estate of Hall, 6 T. C. 933.
'Dec. 15130 (1946).
'"Estate of Neal, 8 T. C. 237 Dec. 15577 (1947), (The court held that an
attempted revocation of powers of appointment given certain remaindermen
in the original deed was ineffective as an attempt to change enjoyment, and
other changes were as to administrative details).
See 8upra, n. 141.
'"E.g., Maloy v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 1104, Dec. 12222 (1941).
Cf. Knapp v. Hoey, 104 F. 2d 99 (2nd Cir. 1939). But see Brown v. Com-




absence of a binding agreement. He could give, tax-free,
$6,000 in total gifts per year to W. and $6,000 worth of furni-
ture company stock per year each to A. and B. 49 It is likely
that H. would desire to make these gifts, because in this way
he could minimize the total taxes payable from his assets
and at the same time advance his dispositive wishes. 5 '
D. Powers Created for the Donee By Another
H. has a Maryland general power of appointment over
realty, which his father left him by will in 1939.111 In con-
sidering what provision for the power should be made in
H.'s estate plan to comply with his dispositive wishes and
at the same time minimize taxes, two questions are pre-
sented. First, if H. does not exercise or release the power,
will it be included in H.'s gross estate for tax purposes?
Second, if the power is one which will be taxed in his
estate, is it possible to avoid this result by an inter vivos
conveyance? To present a comprehensive study of the taxa-
tion of powers which are created for the donee by someone
else, other types than the Maryland general power will be
discussed with reference to these questions.
1. Powers in the donee's estate that
are subject to tadxation
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code taxing
powers of appointment in a donee's estate' 52 can best be
"'The Code provisions and Regulations permitting the marital deduction
In gifts from one spouse to another are similar to the marital deduction
provisions in the estate tax Sections. See supra, Section V B, p. 41. If H.
gave W. total gifts of $6,000 in one year, one-half would receive the marital
deduction, and the other half would not be included in H.'s net gifts for the
year because of the annual exclusion. H. used up his $30,000 exemption
when he made the 1946 gift to his sister, so any amount he gives W. over
$6,000 will be subject to gift taxation. See generally INT. REV. CODE, see.
1004(a) (3); U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 81.16a-81.16d. In order to give
$6,000 free of gift tax to A. and B., H. must have W. join him in making
the gift, which will then be considered as having been made one-half by each
of them. INT. REV. CODE, sec. 1000(f) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 86.3a.
See Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 19418, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 413, 443 (1949) ; Waldron, The Marital Deduction and Split Gift Under
the Revenue Act of 1948, 28 Trust Bull. 10 (Jan., 1949).
'O If H. feels he must control the property until his death, then he should
not make inter vivos conveyances such as these. However, assuming that H.
wants to make these gifts, and that he lives for ten years, then his gross
estate at death will be reduced by about $180,000.
See supra, n. 99, item 1.
INT. REv. CODE, sec. 811(f); see U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24.
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understood if a brief summary of the history of these pro-
visions is first presented.
The various types of powers created for the donee by
another which will today be included in his gross estate by
the Internal Revenue Code will then be discussed, with
particular reference to the power of appointment which H.'s
father gave him by will in 1939.
a. Historical summary
The Revenue Act of 1916153 did not specifically tax
powers of appointment, and regulations' attempting to
tax property passing under a general power of appointment
given the donee by a prior decedent were held invalid under
that Act. 5
In 1918 Congress passed an act with provisions which
remained substantially unchanged until 1942 to the effect
that all property passing under a general power of appoint-
ment exercised by the donee would be considered part of
the donee's estate for tax purposes.'50
It soon became apparent that the provisions of the Act
of 1918 taxing powers given the donee by another were
riddled with loopholes through which the discerning estate
planner could slip to tax immunity.'57 If a power was exer-
cised in favor of the takers in default of appointment to
give them the same shares that the donor gave them by the
default clause, the appointive assets were not taxed as part
of the donee's estate, because they did not pass under the
power but by operation of the clause in default of appoint-
Section 202(a), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
' U. S. Treas. Reg. 37 (1916), as amended by T. D. 2477 (1917).
"'United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct. 256 (1921) ; Accord:
Lederer v. Pearce, 266 Fed. 497 (3rd Cir. 1920) ; Ebersole v. McGrath, 271
Fed. 995 (D. C., S. D. Ohio 1920), appeal dismissed, 272 Fed. 1022 (6th
Cir. 1921).
'Revenue Act of 1918, see. 402(e), 40 STAT. 1097 (1918), provided:
"To the extent of any property passing under a general power of
appointment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed
executed in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after, his death, except in the case of a bona fide sale
for a fair consideration in money or money's worth."
See Griswold, Powers of Appointment and The Federal Estate Tax, 52
Harv. L. Rev. 929 and 967 (1939) ; Leach, Powers of Appointment and the
Federal Estate Ta., - A Dissent, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 961 and 968 (1939).
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ment. 158 The meaning of "general" power was construed by
the courts, with little help from the Regulations, to be the
old property-law definition, with the result that whether
or not a power was subject to taxation in the donee's estate
depended largely upon form rather than substance. 5 "
Finally, under the Revenue Act of 1918 a power must have
been exercised by the donee, or appointive assets would
not be taxed in his estate.16 The donor could provide as
takers in default of appointment those in whose favor the
donee would most likely exercise the power. The donee
could then avoid a tax in his estate on the appointive assets
simply by failing to exercise the power.
In order to close these gaps, Congress passed the 1942
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code with the pro-
visions now in force taxing assets subject to powers of
appointment as part of the donee's estate.'
b. Present law
The new provisions substantially changed the tax law as
it stood prior to 1942 in the following respects:
(1) The class of powers taxable in the donee's estate
was increased to incliide a11 hut ePrtqin .nppifnllv pepvntpd
special powers of appointment;
6 2
"1 Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 45 Yale L. J. 172
(1935). Cf. Rogers' Estate v. Helvering, 320 U. S. 410, 64 S. Ct. 172 (1943) ;
See also Kerr's Estate, 9 T. C. 359 (1947) ; Cardeza's Estate, 5 T. C. 202
(1945).
I" The law of the state where the conveyance took place was determina-
tive of the effect of a transfer, but state law was not controlling in defining
the meaning of "general power" as it was used in the Revenue Acts and
Regulations. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. 2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931), (holding that a
Maryland general power - called by the court a special power - was not
part of the donee's gross estate for purposes of taxation. See Gump, The
Meaning of "General" Powers of Appointment under the Federal Estate Tax,
1 Md. L. Rev. 300, 303 (1937) ; Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the
Federal Estate Tax, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 938 (1939).
110 Whether or not a power was exercised was determined by state law.
E.g., Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 55 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. den. 296
U. S. 578 (1935) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 73 F. 2d 970 (1st
Cir. 1934) ; Blackburne v. Brown, 43 F. 2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1930). Cf. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24.
1"'Revenue Act of 1942, sec. 403(a), (d), amending INT. REv. CODE, sec.
811(f), 56 STAT. 942 (1942).
INT. Rnv. CoDE, sec. 811(f) (2), provides that all powers of appointment
shall be taxed. It then excepts from the definition of "power of appoint-
ment":
"(A) a power to appoint within a class which does not Include any
others than the spouse of the decedent, spouse of the creator of the
power, descendants of the decedent or his spouse, descendants (other
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(2) A power not specifically excepted was made subject
to taxation if it remained unexercised in the donee's estate
at his death, if the donee exercised or released it during
his life in contemplation of or intended to take effect at
or after his death, or if the donee exercised or released the
power during his life but reserved a life estate or the right
to designate future beneficiaries;13
(3) If a power specifically excepted was exercised by
creating another power of appointment, it was no longer
excepted, but the value of the appointive assets were made
part of the donee's estate for tax purposes.8 4
The Federal courts will refer to state law to determine
the incidents of a power to find if it is subject to taxation
in the donee's estate or is specifically excepted from such
taxation.18 5
A general power specifically exercisable in favor of the
donee, or his estate, or the creditors of either, is taxed as
part of the donee's estate, whether or not the donee has
any beneficial interest in the appointive assets.16
A Maryland general power, such as the one H.'s father
gave him, in which the donee has a beneficial interest, is
taxed as part of the donee's estate, because the members of
the class to whom the donee may appoint include others
than those among whom appointment must be limited to
cause a power to be excepted from taxation.8 7 Even if the
than the decedent) of the creator of the power or his spouse, spouses
of such descendants, donees described in sec. 812(d), and donees de-
scribed In sec. 861(a) (3) (public, charitable, and religious donees) ... ;
and (B) a power to appoint within a restricted class if the decedent
did not receive any beneficial interest, vested or contingent, in the prop-
erty from the creator of the power or thereafter acquire any such in-
terest, and if the power is not exercisable to any extent for the benefit
of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate."
Similar definitions appear in INT. REv. CODE, sec. 1000(C). See U. S.
Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24; U: S. Treas. Reg. 108, sec. 86.2(b).See INT. REV. CODE, sec. 811(f) (1) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24(b).
16 IT. REv. CODE, sec. 811(f) (2) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24.
All of the cases found apply to the pre-1942 law. However, state law
would be applied by the Federal courts in tax matters under the provisions
of the Revenue Act of 1942 insofar as it determines such matters as to
whom the donee can appoint or to whom property passes as a result of
intestacy. E.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940) ;
Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. 2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. U. S., 69
F. Supp. 577 (D. C., E. D. Pa. 1946).
' The power is not one of those excepted by INT. REV. CODE, sec. 811-
(f) (2) (A) or (B), supra, n. 162. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24(b).1 7 1 TNT. REV. CODE, sec. 811(f) (2) (A), supra, n. 162. See U. S. Treas. Reg.
105, sec. 81.24(b) (2).
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donee of a Maryland general power has no beneficial in-
terest in the appointive property, the property would be
part of the donee's estate for tax purposes, because appoint-
ment is not limited "within a restricted class".16
Where the donor gives the donee a beneficial interest in
appointive assets subject to a special power of appointment,
such assets would be taxed in the donee's estate, unless the
class within which the donor has limited appointment in-
cludes no others than spouses of the donee or donor, de-
scendants (except the donee) of the donee or donor or
their spouses, certain charities and Federal, state or local
governments for public purposes. 6 9 If the donor gave the
donee a special power but no beneficial interest in the
appointive property, then the donee would pay no estate
tax on the property, if the beneficiaries are a class not un-
reasonably large.170
Although state law is used to determine the incidents
of a given power, it is unlikely that either the nomenclature
in a conveyance or the terminology used by state courts in
describing a power is determinative of taxability.'7 ' There-
fore a power not considered a power of appointment in
Maryland may be taxed as such under the Internal Revenue
Code. Two examples are the power annexed to a life estate
to invade principal and the power given an equitable life
tenant to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust.7 1
If the donor gives his son (or other descendant) a life
estate with power to invade principal, and a remainder to
others, then the value of the remainder is part of the son's
18 The donee of a Maryland general power can appoint to anyone except
himself, his estate, or his creditors. See, e.g., Balls v. Dampman. 69 Md. 390,
394, 16 Atl. 16, 18 (1888). See discussion. supra. Section III A. p. 23. There-
fore, the exception in sec. 811(f) (2) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code,
supra, n. 162, is not applicable.
'8 INT. REv. CODE, see. 811 (f) (2) (A), supra, n. 162. See U. S. Treas. Reg.
105, sec. 81.24,(b) (2).
'" INT. REv. CODE. sec. 811(f) (2) (B), supra, n. 162. See U. S. Treas. Reg.
105. sec. 81.24(b) (2).
1See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24(b) (1), which provides in part:
"The term 'power of appointment' includes all powers which are in sub-
stance and effect powers of appointment regardless of the nomenclature
used in creating the power and local property law connotations." Cf. Leser
v. Burnet. 46 F. 2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931) and the cases cited supra, n. 165.
'"The Regulations suggest that assets subject to either of these powers
are taxed as part of the donee's estate. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 81.24(b) (1).
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estate for tax purposes.173 But if the life estate and power
to invade principal are given to the donor's spouse, the
appointive assets are not taxed in the donee's estate, unless
the courts construe the Code so as to give effect to the
overall objective which its draftsmen seem to have had in
mind. 174 There seems to be no reason for this anomalous
result, except a mistake in drafting the statute. The power
to invade principal for the donee's benefit would probably
be considered a general power under the law in effect before
the Act of 1942,17 and the evident intent to close loopholes
in the taxation of powers of appointment suggests that a
parenthetical exclusion of the donee from the class of
appointees in the excepted powers, when the donee is the
spouse of the donor, was inadvertently left out of the
statute.1
78
A power to invade principal for the benefit of members
of a restricted class not including the donee, if given to
him by someone else, would not cause assets subject to the
power to be included in the donee's estate.177
A power annexed to a life estate to alter, amend, revoke,
or terminate the remainder would cause assets subject to
the power to be taxed in the donee's estate, unless the
'74 INT. REV. CODE, sec. 811(f) (2) (A), supra, n. 162. The son or other
descendant is the decedent. A power to appoint to the decedent is expressly
excluded from the powers excepted from taxation. See U. S. Treas. Reg.
105, sec. 81.24(b) (1).
17 INT. REV. CODE, sec. 811(f) (2) (A), supra, n. 162. The parenthetical ex-
pression, "other than the decedent", is left out after the phrase, "spouse of
the decedent". Schwab v. Allen, 78 F. Supp. 234 (D. C., M. D. Ga. 1948),
noted 22 So. Calif. L. Rev. 513 (1949). The court stated a conclusion with-
out giving any reasons for its decision. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, see.
81.24(b) (1), where the following example appears: ". . . if a settlor trans-
fers property in trust for the life of his wife, with a power in the wife to
appropriate or consume the principal of the trust, the wife has a power
of appointment" (which is included in her gross estate for tax purposes).
15INT. REV. CODE, see. 811(f), (as originally enacted). See U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, sec. 81.24(a), which still applies to estates where the donee died
before October 21, 1942.
16 See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 255 (1946 Supp.), where
the author suggests that a court should construe see. 811 (f) (2) (A) of the
Code substantially so as to exclude from the powers excepted from taxation
in the donee's estate a power in a spouse to invade corpus. There is also an
argument to the effect that a life estate with a power to invade corpus is
akin to owned property, hence is subject to taxation under INT. REV. CODE,
sec. 811(a). But see Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U. S. 56,
62 S. Ct. 925 (1942), (see. 811 (f) operated to exclude any power of appoint-
ment from the general language in 811(a) ) ; Estate of Schwartz v. Com-
missioner, 6 T. C. M. 139, Dec. 15621(M) (1947).
"7 INT. REV. CODE, see. 811(f) (2) (B), supra, n. 162.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
exercise of the power was limited to an appointment (in
effect) among the class of appointees excepted in Section
811 f(2)A of the Code.178
If the donor gives the donee only a power to invade
principal or power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,
but no beneficial interest in the appointive assets, then the
assets will not be included in the donee's estate for tax
purposes, if the power can be exercised only within a class
not unreasonably large.179
2. Escape Provisions
Because of the changes made by the Revenue Act of
1942, provisions were included in the Act to allow the re-
lease free of gift tax prior to July 1, 1951,180 of powers, which
otherwise would be taxed in the donee's estate, created on
or before October 21, 1942.181 But in most jurisdictions a
change in the property law was necessary to permit the
release of testamentary powers of appointment.' 2
In 1943 the Maryland Legislature passed a statute per-
mitting a donee to release any type of power of appointment
by deed, will, or otherwise.' 8  But in O'Hara v. O'Hara,4
' This result Is suggested by U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, see. 81.24(b).
"0 INT. REV. CODE, see. 811(f) (2) (B), supra, n. 162.
, The code has been successively amended by joint resolution to extend
the period within which a power must be released.
'8 Revenue Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 944 (1942). See U. :S. Treas. Reg. 105,
sec. 81.24(b) (3), U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, see. 86.2(b) (2), (3).
18 To date, statutes permitting the release of powers of appointment have
been enacted in twenty-eight states and Hawaii. In Maryland it is likely
that the donee of a Maryland general power could release it before the
statute was passed. White v. Roberts, 145 Md. 405, 125 Atl. 733 (1924). Cf.
Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67 (1881), (release of a power appendant). See
MILLER, WiLLs 755-758 (1927) ; Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers, 24
Harv. L. Rev. 511 (1911).
'8 MD. CODE SuPP., Art. 93, see. 345A (1947), which provides in part:
"Unless the instrument creating the same specifically provides to the
contrary, a power of appointment of any kind or character, whether
now existing or hereafter created by deed, by will or otherwise, and
whether exercisable by deed, by will, by deed or will or otherwise, may,
at one (sic) time or from time to time, as to all or any part of the
property, real, personal and mixed, subject to such power, be released
in whole or in part and if in part, in such manner as to limit the persons
or objects, or classes of persons or objects, in whose favor such power
would otherwise be exercisable; . .. ".
See also MD. CODE 'Supp., Art. 93, sec. 347B (filing provisions) and 347C
(statement that sec. 347A is in accord with the public policy of Maryland)
(1947).




the Court of Appeals by way of dictum set forth the rule
that a general and beneficial power of appointment exer-
cisable by will may be released, so long as the donor's in-
tent is not thereby frustrated. The court does not refer to
the statute permitting the release of any type of power of
appointment, nor is there a clear statement that there was
no clause in default of appointment included in the instru-
ment creating the power.
Assuming that there was no clause in default of appoint-
ment, the decision in the O'Hara case is correct. 8 5 However,
the dictum stating that only a general and beneficial power
may be released is clearly in conflict with the statutory
provisions permitting the release of any type of power.
The donee of a true general power of appointment may
release the power under both the O'Hara dictum and the
statutory provisions.18 6
H., who is the donee of a Maryland general power,
probably may release it even if the O'Hara dictum is fol-
lowed, because the courts of Maryland call this type of
power a "general" power.8 " But it is not likely that the
O'Hara dictum will be followed, in a case involving the
release of either a Maryland general or a special power,
since it was not a considered interpretation of the statutory
provisions permitting the release of any type of power.
'm The release of a power of appointment occurs when the donee ex-
tinguishes it by relinquishing his right to exercise the power, and in effect,
appoints to the takers In default of appointment. See Gray, Relea8e and
Di8charge of Power8, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 511 (1911). In O'Hara v. O'Hara,
185 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d 813 (1945), if there was no clause in default, the
agreement to devise a part of the appointive assets was a contract to
appoint, and therefore was unenforceable. RESTATEMENT, PRoPEnTy, sec.
334 (1940). See 8upra, n. 20.
1w By definition a general power may be exercised in favor of the donee,
his estate, or his creditors. See 8upra, Section II A, p. 15. Therefore, It is
also a beneficial power and fits the requirement of O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185
Md. 321, 326, 44 A. 2d 813, 816 (1945). The further requirement of the
O'Hara dictum that the release of a general power must not violate the
donor's intent in order to be valid, Is nebulous. It would most likely be
operative only where -the donor expressly states that a power he creates
shall not be released. In such a situation this result would follow without
the dictum.
'87The release of a Maryland general power was held valid In White v.
Roberts, 145 Md. 405, 125 AUt. 733 (1924). In O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md.
321, 44 A. 2d 813 (1945), involving a Maryland general power, the court
seems to Imply that were the contract there Involved a release rather than
an attempt to exercise the power, It would have been enforceable.
19511
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In planning H.'s estate it is safe to advise him to release
the power to A., B., and C., who are the takers in default
of appointment; but to avoid payment of the gift tax, he
must execute the release before July 1, 1951.188 The estate
planner should also apprise H. of the confusing state of the
law and leave the ultimate decision whether or not to
release the power in his discretion."5 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Rules of property law should be sufficiently certain to
permit a lawyer to predict with reasonable accuracy the
effect of provisions in an instrument he is drawing for a
client. Yet rules of property law should also reflect current
social attitudes. The present emphasis in all areas of the
law on recognizing substance rather than form in reaching
a given result is somewhat inconsistent with the predicta-
bility desirable in the property law. The minority Mary-
land rule initiated in Balls v. Dampman,10 although based
upon form rather than upon substance, is too firmly em-
bedded in the law of powers of appointment of this state
to be overruled by the Court of Appeals. But with this rule
in existence it is still possible to attain a sound structure of
the law of powers of appointment in Maryland.
The Balls rule should be limited in application to the
situation where the donor creates a power of appointment
without including specific language permitting the donee
to appoint to himself, his estate, or his creditors. Creditors
of the donee of a true general power should be permitted to
reach the appointive assets to satisfy their claims, if the
donee's owned assets are insufficient to meet his obligations.
It would be best to cast aside the rule that the donee must
attempt to exercise the power for creditors to reach appoin-
tive assets. Maryland courts should follow the lead set by
the federal government in the Bankruptcy Act and the
Internal Revenue Code, which use as a test the type of
power, not whether an attempt has been made to exercise it.
I See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.24(b) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, see. 86.3.
10 H. will probably wish to release the power, because he would not there-
by lose the income from the life estate.1-069 Md. 390, 394, 16 A. 16, 18 (1888).
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The Balls rule should not be extended to prevent the
donee of a Maryland general power from appointing to his
spouse, if he wishes to do so. But in the absence of an
appointment to her, a court should not permit the spouse
of the donee of this type of power to reach the appointive
assets for dower or a statutory share at his death. The many
decisions on dower and the words of the statute giving a
surviving spouse a share in the estate of the decedent both
indicate that she has an interest only in his owned assets.
However, if legal results are to be based upon substance
rather than upon form, the Maryland Legislature should
change the present law of dower and stautory shares to
permit a surviving spouse to reach assets subject to a true
general power.
When planning the estate of a Maryland testator, the
draftsman must consider the interplay of the Maryland law
and the Internal Revenue Code. The results are predictable
with reasonable accuracy in most areas of the taxation of
powers of appointment, but the complicated provisions of
the Code and Regulations are full of pitfalls for the unwary
estate planner. Therefore, a draftsman should study these
provisions carefully before he drafts any instrument con-
taining a power.
The law of powers of appointment is a relatively un-
developed area of the property law of the United States.
It is to be hoped that as this field becomes more developed,
results will be based more upon substance than upon form,
yet that the predictability essential to efficient draftsman-
ship will be preserved.
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